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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Le I and F. Smi th' for the Master of Arts Ln 
.. 
Economics presented .March 22, 1974. 
Title: The Effectiveness of Induced Location ·of Manufacturing Indus.try 
As A Means of Fost·ering Sustairied'"Economic Growth in Less 
Developed Regions ,of Oregon.: 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITIEE: 
Richard B. Halley, Chairman \ 
Richard p. Lycan Giles Burgess 
The subject of this .. ~hesis was chosen from both a professional and 
an academic interest, in the .economicdeveloPrnent 'of Oregon .. ". Prompt~d 
by proposals made to the O~egon LegisLature to i~.itiate various forms of 
industrial subsidy programs to disperse economic growth and population 
. , 
,aw~y from 'congest~d areas, . til i s .r~.se~ r'ch 'effort ,seeks to prov i de an' ' 
evaluative analysis 'of the' effectiveness:of sU,bsi,dy techniques in inffu-
encing Industrial .. location 'and s~imulating a sustained growth process iri' 
"f " 
I e'ss deve loped areas. 
Research was undertaken in two' pdmary .subJects: I) the.ory of 
regional economic developmen~ and the effects of subs,idies ,on the growth, 
p~ocess; and 2) empirical 'evidence 'of '~he 'effect~veness.of industrial 
. , ., . , . 
subsidy programs on region~l developmen~ 'in othe~ areas. Information 
§ I _~'._ 
was obtained from the following, resour,ce 
\ 
\ ' 
" 
I), ,The author"s I ibrary of reference I iterature on economic devel-
,opment and the bibliographie~ contained therein; 
2) Professional organizations, partlcula~ly'the 1 ibrary ~f,the 
American Industrial Development Council, as wel-l aS,requests for 
1 iterature from vari'ous mef1lbers 'o.f: those organizations; 
3) Universit~ )ibrary resourceS, includi~g: 
a) 'Bureaus of Business Research, BIbliograp~y, 1968-1970; 
b) Pub! ic'Affairs Information Service, 1965-J,an. 3, 1973; 
'c) Business Periodicals Index, 1965~1972;-
'. 
d) Journal of Economic Articles,: 1967-Dec. ,1972; 
'-. ~ 
e) Index to Economic Liter:ature, 1966-1970;, 
;, f) U.S. Library of Congress, National Union Catalog. 1960-1972; 
,'g) Council bf Pl'anning Ubi-adans, Bibliographies; 
,. 
h} Colorado University, Public Catalog. of Norlin Library holdings; 
i) Colorado Technical R.eference Center': 
f 
Us i ng i nformat Ion obta i ned from t/:lese and other s'ources, a method 
was obtained for ,defining and measuring the econ9mic and social welfa're 
objectives"of a regionaldevel~pmt;lnt program in Oregon.G~~graphical 
patterns of economic health indicators were mapped for the' state.', 
. ,. - .~ " - . 
, ~,' 
This is followed by, an analysis of ;var.ious types of subsidies and 
~ . ' ~ '" '" . " . ; 
, , 
their effeCts·on resburce allocation and !gross o'utpu't. U was found 
. ~ ~ . 
." ~' ~ ~ :' 
that wage subsidies offer optimul)l bene,fits for lab9r-surplus areas with 
. . . '. ... , " ... ~ 
! 
less distortion ~f tapital .efficlency than do capital or price subsidies. 
Justification for subsidies was fQund to be 'greatest using social. bene- , 
fits as cr'iteria 'rather' than maximization of economic output. 
The influence of industrial subsidi,es on location deCisions is ' 
';, :. 
, , 
'. , 
, '. ,~ , -
• 1 " 
, . 
. ;~ .~. 
3 
"-"',,, 
, 
then exam'i ned. Following an analysis of effects of.subsidies on the 
cost structure and profit potential for the ~irm, 'financial and ~ax 
" incentives are s~parately reviewed in case histories of " subsidy ' pro-
'grams. ,'rt'was fou~d that capital investment subsidies~hav'e,had consid-
erably more l~cafi~n influence than tax subsidie,s. In any case, 'however. 
, ' , 
:subsidies'were'det~rmined to be marginal,'rat:h'er than d~cisive. loca-
tional factors with ',more basic ,economic criteria, such-·as labor avail-' 
. >' 
ab iIi 'ty . and market' access,' be i ng more i nf I uent i a 1. 
, , 
Finally, cost/benefit,considerations for subsidy programs in 
" , 
Oregon,are revlewed~ Exte~nal'effe~is of in~u~trialization o~ rural 
',.~conomies:are consi~ered .. and ~he growth cen'ter' concept for maximizati'on 
of economic gain, is examined. ,Fiscal costs Jot" state and local govern-
ments :ar~ explored :for ,di'f~erent types of sub~idy programs. "'The,'conclu-
sion is rea,ched that'program'~ ca~ b~ devised which minimize fiscal costs 
. ~ ~ 
wh 11 e offer i ng max imum potent i a 1 econ?n1 i <:= and soci a I' ,benef its. 
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lNTRODUCTION 
. 
A,desire to alter the patterns ,of econ'omie activity in the state 
of Oregon resul ted i~' th~ creat ion' in Jun,e: 1972, of the Oregon Senate 
Task Force on' Economic DeveloP'Tlent. In creating the Ta'sk Force, the" 
., Oregon Senate President stated: IIpopulat"ion imb~lance between our rural 
,,' 
areas and the centr~l valley co~e, particularly the Tri-County Metro~ 
I 
,I , 
po I i tan Area, is becom i ng an: i ncreas tng threat to both Oregon's economy 
.. ". 
" and, its environment."Thus: II ~ •• the time has. come for the legisla-
~ .~, 
ture to put 'forth a rea1istic package of 'inc~ntives wh'iCh will both. 
" induce business away cfrom our heavi Iy' pop'ul,ata'd areas and at the saQle 
time give our people in, the rura,1 'areas an alternative ,to moving to 
the citi~s:nl With the ne~d and purpose thus defin'ed, the Task Force 
was charged to study various pr:~grams of econ6mi'c ,incentives and to 
.; ..... 
, , 
'make recommendat ions' as ,to wh i cll' of these,:p rograms might be app 1 jed in' 
, . " . 
, , 
a c?ordina~ed s~a:e 'pol icy that wouldenc'ourage indu~triat development 
. " 
in,non-metropolitan parts of Oregon. 2 
, " 
" .' .... With 'this acti~orl,Oregon has joi'ned'with most o~.her'states in 
_ lpo~ing ~t m~ans to 'at~ract indu~t~y ,~nd ~Q influence it~ 10c~tio~ 
" with in the s,tate through the use' of' spe~ i;a I i ncent ives,. The j ncent Iyes 
Force on' 
. to 
--------~----~--------------~ 
, ! 
:: : 
.tv 
, " 
that are presently employed in other areas take many different forms 
and are diverse in their applications and methods of administration. 
Analyzing the many permutations available under the various legislative 
programs would be beyond the scope of this study. However, a summary 
of state programs is provided in an appendix. They generally fall into 
2 
the three classifications of (1) financial assistance for new or expand-
ing companies, (2) tax credits for new industrial operations, and (3) 
special services for industrial development. 3 
The last of these is more of a planning and promotional tool than 
an inducement to industry. Such programs have become so widespread 
that they are more normally expected services rather than special induce-
ments. They include the data research services of state development 
agencies, 'site )location searches, various forms of technical assistance 
and a variety of other services by state and local agencies. State 
development agencies also work with local development corporations and 
communities within the state to help them build programs to attract 
industries. 
As this kind of development assistance is presently available in 
Oregon through the Economic Development Division, this paper will be 
addressed to the direct subsidization proposals being considered, spe-
cificallyfinancial and tax incentives to firms locating new facil ities 
in designated areas of underdevelopment. 
The analysis will be directed toward the economic efficiency of 
3IIlustrations showing the various state programs in these three 
categories ar~ included in the appendix. Data are from the 1972 Site 
Selection Handbook, Vol. I (Atlanta: Conway Research, Inc., 1972). 
Various other references are included in the bibl iography which also 
define and analyze these programs. 
the methods considered to achieve the assumed objectives of such 
programs, principally that the induced location of certain industrial 
activities will produce the stimulus for sustained growth in the bene-
ficiary areas and that the resulting altered growth patterns will 
4'· 
reduce income inequalities and stabil ize local tax bases. Thus, the 
expenditure of publ ic funds or the foregoing of tax revenues to influ-
ence the location of an industrial plant is justified in terms of the 
long-run economic returns that will be generated through the process 
of sustained growth. 5 
The validity of this assumption will be assessed by an examina-
tion of the appl icable principles of economic efficiency in terms of 
costs and benefits, and by reviewing incentive programs which have 
been appl ied in other areas and analyzing their results. While the 
scope of such a review must necessarily be I imited, there is a growing 
3 
body of I iterature which gives evaluative analyses of the effectiveness 
of incentive programs in the United States, Canada and some European 
nations which can be used to support some general conclusions on the 
subject. . 
This study, then, will undertake to examine the criteria by which 
regional economic development can be measured, to analyze the types of 
subsidies which might be offered, and to describe how such programs 
actually work to attract and disperse economic activity to designated 
locations. Finally, the effectiveness and social costs of industrial 
4 
Kenneth J. Crepas and Richard A. Stevenson, IIAre Industrial Aid 
Bonds Fulfill ing Their Intended Purpose?lI, Financial Analysts Journal, 
Vol, XXIV (November-December, 1968), p. 106. 
5Industrial Aid Financing (New York: Goodbody & Co., 1965), 
pp. 33-34. 
4, 
subsidization for regional development wil,l 'be considered. 
.. .:~ 
,; ,. 
~-
, 1 
\ ' 
" 
" ' 
':,.. 
.1. 
\ ' 
.,: 
" 
.. . 
> ,'! 
CHAPTER II 
pBJECTIVES AND M~ASUREMENT OF REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN OREGON 
~ . ", 
': , The 'program,s being considered .intliis pape.r have the common 
., 
purpose of influencing the location oi'n~w . in~dust~ial activities. 
Inducing a firm to bu.i'td a pla~t j'n,a' less-devel?ped are'a, however, 
.', . is not sufficient 'for assuming that a sustained economic growth process 
, . 
has been stimulated. This cha~ter will examine the-regi6"al develop-
ment pro~e·ss .. in terms.of·both economic ~nd social benefit cdter'ia,' , 
, .> "'~, ~ ;;: . ... '~- ~ . .>- "" :.~ ~) , ~ • 
citi'ng,dat? for Oregon which "relate~ to evjdenc~ of j'nt~a-regional 
, 'disparities,: This, examination will prov-i'd'e a .framework for ~stimatirjg 
+ " '.. 
h ... 
the resu 1 t s ,f()1" Oregon of a d~ve l'opment d i ~pe ~sa 1 p' rog ram, 'as we 1 I as'" 
.~ ,.0.', 
, , • i> • ... 'Y ~ .: ,'~ 
comparing those:'results. in terms of ·sHni·lar natJonal, state and local 
object.ives •.. 
" ' 'S i nee some bas i s~for' eva J ua.t i ng reg; ona I d~vel opment needs to be 
~ est'abl ~she~" a definition,of the 'pr'ocess 'which, offers meas'urable cri'-
,teria ,~ill be he~pful to our 'analysis.,' S,uch, a, definition, is offered 
by, Krutilla, ~ho 's~at~s that: 
Regional developme~t has b~en defined as a process resulting 
" in a secular rise in. regional output 'or, real income. Increas-
ing regional output and income implies both expansion of the 
region's productive capacity and growth of effective demand 
for the region's output.." B,oth conditions are necessary and 
combined wil~ represent a'sufficien~ condition for:'regionai 
. . dave 1 opment. . ". '.' 
'6John 'V. Krutilla,,)'Criteria for Evaluating' Regional Development 
Programs~1l in Re lonal Develo ment and Plannin ,:ed. by John Friedmann 
, and Wi l1.iam Alonso Cambridge: M. LT. Press, 1964), p.,605'. ' 
,,' 
;', 
, i 
Krutillals definition lends itself to the economic objective of 
an industrial incentive program which intends to expand the productive 
capacity of a region by attracting new industrial facil ities, thus 
increasing regional output and raising income levels. By including a 
demand fu~ction in his definition, Krutilla recognizes that expanding 
regional productive capacity also requires expanding demand for the 
regionls products and that the region itself can become a larger custo-
mer for its own products by altering its industrial structure. 
A problem immediately arises, however, in the determination of 
just what is defined as a IIregion. 1i Any pol icy which seeks to redirect 
industrial activities from one area to another will have an impact 
beyond what can be measured in the immediate area of new investment. 
It has been a criticism of industrial subsidy programs that the gains 
they produce in one area are offset by equal or larger losses when 
results are measured on a broader scale. A review of programs in 
Canada, for example, found that the development pol icies carried out 
by provincial governments to raise growth rates in the poorer regions 
may also be incompatible with federal policies which are designed to 
increase the total national growth rate. 7 The basis for this argument 
is that such programs tend to misallocate resources nationally by 
shifting investment and production from more to less economically 
8-justifiable locations. 
Since this paper is considering matters pertaining to government 
6 
7Richard Hopkinson, "Government Financial Assistance for Industrial 
Development in Canada,11 The Conference Board Record, V (Apr; I, 1968). 
pp. 20-23. 
8Richard E. Low, itA Refinement of Local Industrial Subsidy Tech-
niques: Comment," Mississippi Valley Journal, IV (Spring, 1969), p. 78. 
pol icy decisions in Oregon~ a purely self-interest attitude might 
regard the state boundaries as del ineating the region. State pol icies, 
then, would ignore external effects upon areas outside the state 
boundaries. Instead, the objective might be to expand the output and 
raise income levels for the state of Oregon regardless of the conse-
quences of such po I i ci e"s on othe j- areas. 
That kind of policy, however, could not ignore the aggregate 
effects of alteritlg the intra-regional industrial structure. Thus, if 
applying industrial subsidies only to specified areas produced a shift 
of resources to less efficient uses, resulting in local gains but an 
aggregate decl ine in output and incomes for the state as a whole, then 
efforts to improve local economies might conflict with overall goals 
for the state. 
7 
The problem of defining the region for measuring development gains, 
then, becomes very important. If limited geographical areas within the 
state are defined as regions, it might be possible to accompl ish sector-
ial development objectives but only at the expense of broader state 
interests. An optimum might be attained, however, if development of 
sub-areas within the state were achieved with a corollary rise in over-
all output and incomes at the state and national levels. 
Krutilla1s definition of regional development, rooted in economic 
efficiency, presents us with a major concern over how the results of 
development pol icies are to be measured. The question of optimality 
of efficiency in resource allocation will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next chapter where it can be considered in terms of specific 
types of subsidies. For the present, it will be considered sufficient 
to note its importance in" defining the geographical area in which 
8 
results will be measured and judged. 
Output and incomes are not the only criteria by which development 
programs need be measured, however. Various kinds of social benefits 
can also apply. In assessing the justification for reallocating capital 
resources, Richardson finds that the social arguments are generally 
stronger than economic arguments, particularly if we assume .a national 
pol icy of maximizing output and further assume that firms will find 
their most efficient locations through free market forces. 9 Among the 
possible social benefits cited by Richardson are the utilization of 
unemployed labor, the widening of locational preferences and the r~duc-
tions of diseconomies in congested areas. Richardson also cites a 
possible economic benefit to existing firms from creation of external 
economies and agglomeration effects. 
Referring again to the report of the Oregon Senate Task Force on 
Economic Development, cited in the last chapter, there is considerable 
similarity between Richardson's social benefit considerations and the 
reasons given to justify a subsidy program in Oregon. To measure the 
results of a subsidy program, then, the social benefit considerations 
would appear to offer criteria equally val id to purely economic consid-
erations. It would rest with the State to define the acceptable level 
of trade-offs between social benefits and economic costs, or between 
local versus statewide development objectives. To some degree, such 
decisions will be affected by the relative efficiencies of various types 
of subsidy programs, and these will be examined in the next chapter. 
However, the social benefit argument depends upon the assumption 
.9Harry W. Richardson, Regional Economics (New York: Praeger, 1969), 
pp. 386-428. 
• ~ I " 
,'., 9 
that there are, in fact". certa·in di·spari~ies which could be cor.r:ected 
by us~ of'a subsidy progrC;lm ,to; disperse economic activities wrthln the: 
.state. In 'order" to as:ess the need f~f", ,; an'd potent i a l' benef i ts of, ,any 
I " State 'programs' to' encourage .t~e 'dispersal of population and economic 
growth in Oregon, some 'prel iminary recognition '~hould be give~, to the 
" ' , . , 
existing geographic p.atterhs.of major econolJl·ic, indi.cators within the 
". ' , ' 
state., Fo'~tunately, "a' model~ for doin~ t~is was 'developed in' 1960' for 
, ,.'. 10 
New York State by a tea'm ~f researchers from Syracuse un.ivers ity" 
Among the conclusions stated in their report is, that: liThe procedures, 
employed .-n this anafysis of New York State could be applied. to any part, 
\ "of the United',States, and,theoretically at' least, to 'any part of the"", 
wo~ld.1I11. 'On thi's basis', 'their model is .herein applied,.w,ith Tllodifica.-
, " 
'dons, to Oreg~~'. < 
Beginning with the recognition that no single ,indicator' 'issuffi-
ci ent to measure e i th'e r ,the I eve 1 or trend ,'o{'econom i c 'health, 'the" 
.' .. . ~.- '''. 
model-: u"s,es,a. composite of nine indica.tors whrch"th~ authors felt were 
"~ignifi'~ant~ ,Gou~ties .we~e 'us~d 'as the ~tat'istic,al urdt bec'ause of the,:, 
i~ 
, 
. wide vari ety of econdm'j c data .ava i I ab Ie.', The nine i nd i cators us'ed' in':' 
the,i r ana I ys is .we r,e ~as ,fC? i l'c)ws:'~" , 
, . 
, 'Per Cap,ita Income, ,1,958. ,By ,imp p cat ion ~ the h j gher-the, per.,~ 
". . 
cap i ta income" the be~ter the econom i c Iiea I th'; Thfs indicator'measures 
the relative ·levels. of 'economic healt.h b~tween,count:ies.· 
Ilicrease in Per ,Capita Income, 1950-i957 •. The 'fmpl~ication. is .t'I:!~.~~ 
10' '. '. ' John H. Thompsoh, Sydney C. Sl.!'frin, Peter R.'Gould,·and ,Marion 
A. Buck".'IToward A Geography 'of Economic Heal th:t The .'c.ase of' New YorK' .' 
,State," in Regional Development and .Planning, op. cit .• pp. !87-206 • 
II. Ib i d. ~ p: '\206,. 
I' 
:' '-, 
/ : < 
".: 
10 
the greater the increase in per capita income, the better the economic 
health. This is a trend indicator so the geographical pattern would 
not necessarily conform to that shown by income levels. 
Average Unemployment, 1949-1958. Lower unemployment levels would 
imply better economic health. This is also useful as a separate item 
for analysis as unemployment is the indicator most widely used to 
identify economic distress. 
Per Cent Growth of Total Employment, 1947-1956. This trend 
indicator impl ies that the higher the growth rate, the better the 
economi c hea,l th. 
Per Cent Growth of Population, 1950-1956. Higher population 
growth rates generally imply a trend toward better economic health. 
Except for the suburbanization phenomena, it is not likely that large 
population gains would occur in any area that does not provide economic 
support. Declines in population would be 'expected to reflect limited 
or declining employment opportunities. 
Per Cent Population in 20-49 Year Age Group, 1950. This is 
essentially the working force age group, so lerger percentage. would 
reflect higher levels of economic health. 
Per Cent Increase in Value Added by Manufacture, 1947-'1954. It is 
implied by this trend ind.icator that the greater the increase, the better 
the economic health. 
Per Cent Growth in Retail Sales l 1948-1958. Retail sales growth 
is impl ied to show a trend in economic health. 
Increase in Annual Average Weekly Wage and Salary Earnings, 1950-
1958. This trend indicator implies a direct relationship between the 
size of the increase and the economic health of the statistical unit. 
It will be noted that these nine indicaters measure beth levels 
and. trends 'Of 'ecenemic health: Their cempesite, then, gives a geegra-
phic pattern ~hich rei~ects'b6ih'sfati~ ~nd d~naMic elements' in the 
st'ate's ecenemy., 
This study preceeded to give the rank 'Order 'Of ceunties by eac'h: 
,i nd i cater" then to sum 'the ran~s and g i.ve ~- new, rank 'Order based en an . 
equal-weighting cempesite. The resuli was divided ihie qUinti'lei which 
,. - , 
were g'raphically recerded en a state map 'shewing ceunty beundaries • 
I I 
. ' Th i 5 map 1 I abe I ed "Gene ra 1 .E~enern i c' Hea I th (a~ basedo'n 'e~ua I we i gMt i ng) • II . 
, , 
previded a'visual pattern 'Of ecenemic health in the state 'Of New yerk.' 
In, applying this medel. to Oregen; certain prebleJ1ls emerged'with 
the data. 'Statistics en unemploymen~" fer exampJe, are generally 
available,fe'r ceunties except where ,the Oregen State"Empleyment Divisien 
, . , 
uses the· II Laber Market ·Area" cencep,t .. , Under that cencept, the Divisien 
uses, a'sin~le statistie' fer c~mbinafiens '9f Ma~ien,and Pel'k ceunties; : 
,', Sherman and Wasce ceunties; t1ultnemah, C.1~ckarnas and Washingten ceunties " 
combined'with Clark County,,:Washingten; and Malheur County cembined with 
:.' . l . 
" Payette and,Washingt?n ceunt,ies ,in Idahe.: In these instances, 'the: 
,si~gle'laber market.area,rate,of'unemployment'~as used ~e~ each' Oregen 
ceunty within that area. It weuld· be eXRec.ted ~hat uS'ing 'th'is IT!ulti:: 
ceun~y average weuld 'preduce ,differ~nt r~sul ts than: if each ceunty had, 
< " .. ~ " • it ~ • , ' 
, 
'been ,measured separately. Hewever;' 'since"ceu'n~y beundaries are arbit-", 
rary and the purpese 'Of this 'r~pert i~ to identify 'general ecenemic 
, " 
patterns; the result 'Of using the (aber mar~et area cencept .in these 
-" . ~, 
few instances sheuld not, appreciably alte'-~ the val idity of this i,ndic~ter 
'Of ecenemic heal'th.,' 
" .: i, . 
•• -t 
, /;- . 
" 
" 
, ; 12 
A greater problem occurred with the valu'e added data. Because of' 
the small number of manufacturing establ ishments in several co~nties, 
" , ". ~ 
data were withheld from publication for seven counties to avoid dis-
, 
closure for individual firms. In those cases, the ,ran'k order compos-
ftus 'wore, based on eight indfcators, father than' nine" and wel'ghted ' 
'~. , ' . _.... . 
, . 
. 
accordingly. It should De further reaLized, ,however, that'where the 
manufacturing base is small of concentrated into singfe ind~stries, ,~s 
Is the case,in much o~ Oregon, th~n t~is:indicator is subje~t to wfd~ 
, . 
fluxuations from relatLvely small absol~t~ cha~ges:' ~ince the ~rtimate ~ 
purpos~ of this analysis 'i~'to prepare the gt?undwork'f6r ~rogra~s 
ai,med at dispersing m~nufacturing employment, however, this indicator 
,'-was retained 'as significant for that purpose. 
Finally, 'the increase i~' ano~al .verage weekli wag~ and salary: " 
earnLngs proved simply to .. notbe ava'ilable.-'However,the 'l,970 CensuS _ . 
. ............ -
, 
of Population provided 'a useful measure'of economic health which was -
not available when the New York mo~el '-wa~ develo~ed. : This measure \>las',· 
" 
the percentage of Persons earning below the poverty" level"of ,income. in 
1969. 'This seemdd sGitabl~ significant to, substitute it for the ,missi~g 
" ' ,
indicatqr bas~d on ~arnin~s.' 
Us iog more "cur rent data, ~hen", the' fo II o,w i ng', i nd i cator,s, were 
, , 
utilized in determin'ing the geographi.c pattern of,economic health in 
~ . 
Oregon: " 
1. Per' Cent, Population 'Growth', 1960-l970. 
2. Per Cent ~rowth in 20-49 Age ,Group, 19,60-1970;: 
3. !'er., Cap ita Income ,. 1969." 
4. Per: Cent of Persons ,B,elow'Poverty Level of Income, 1969. 
. -' 
~. ~ , ' 
'5. Per Cent Increase.,in'Median Income for Families and Unrelated 
'Individuals, 1959-1969. ~' .," /' 
~ . "'". t, 
,', 
" , 
" 
..... :: /" 
" 
'~.~ .,-
• ~. ~ '. t 
L 
, " 
. ~ . 
6. Per Cent Growth ,in Employment, 1965-:-1971." 
7. Pef Cent'lncrease in- Val~~ Add~d by Manufacture~ 1963-1967. 
8. Per Cent Growth in Retail Sales,' 196i-1967. 
9. Ave rage Tota I Unemp I oyment Rate. 19'62-1971. 
"On the bas is of the' county rank i ngs for, each i nd i cator t the 
composite was drawn'and mappeA by quafti,les. The result 'is the map" 
. show i ng the ,Genera I Econom i c Hea I th for Oregon as Based on Equa I 
, Weighting of ,Indicators '(Figure I)'. 
. " 
The patterns produced by this modej were predictable in several 
instances but also presented'"a' few'surprises,.: Of the nine, counties 
in the fir'st ql!artile, 'six are, in th~,upper Wi'llamette Valley, as 
13 
. expected .. , The othe'rthree, however, are, located ·in central and eastern . 
. 
O"regon. Deschutes, Harney and Union countie.s generally ranked in the 
,upper ha'l f ,of a II i nd i cators and' showed ~uff i c i ent st r~ngth in one or 
more categor i es 'to ach i eve' that first quart i I e' 'rank i ng . 
. ~ 
" 
In the second quartil~, four of ,the nin~ ~~unties,1 ie in th~ 
, - ~ ~ ~ " 
, ~ 
. - ~ ., -
Willamette Valley, placing all,of the cou'nties' in'this valley in the 
upper half.' The ,other counties' in ~he'second quarti.le In'clude Jackson 
and Klamath: inso~thern Or'egon;Clatso·p,' in northwes~' Oregon; an~ " 
.-, 
'Crook and Umati lla in the eastern part:of.; the state. , 
~ ;,. - . 
Counties 1'n the third quar!i,le show uneven geographic distribution,' 
as do those in the fourth." Whi,le <::ounti~s in central and eastern Oregon 
are often regar~ed as'mos,t in need :of ecc;momic stimul,ation, coastal ", 
counties also gener~lly show lower 'levelS' of e~onomic' health. It, is, 
also worth noting that the presence. of a:regional urbancenter'within, 
a county does not necessar.ilY lead to' higher, leve'ls of'economic health 
than exists in counties which are entirely rural ,in character. ',.Thus,> 
," , 
, , 
Douglas County, which contains the urban center of Roseburg, ranked in 
the third quartile and Josephine County, where Grants Pass is located, 
ranked in the fourth. 
14 
The data included in the tables provide the basis for much more 
thorough discussion on the relative problems of Oregon counties and are 
included for that purpose. It would be worth exploring, for example, 
whether Harney County's low unemployment rate was due to sufficient 
opportunities to meet the demand or, instead, to a known lack of oppor-
tunities which cause unemployed persons to move away or dro~ out of the 
labor force. In Jackson and Josephine counties, relatively high levels 
of population growth coupled with poorer performance in the income 
indicators might warrant examination into the types of people moving 
into southern Oregon; e.g., if a disproportionate share of the inctease 
is caused by in-migration of low-income retirees, then how does this 
affect the need for additional employment opportunities? 
Other indicators could also be added and measured to provide 
knowlerdge on subjects of specific interest; e.g., assessed valuations, 
tax revenues, and general expenditures of counties to measure the 
economic health of local governments. The usefulness of such indicators 
may depend upon certain assumptions and value judgements, however, so 
they should be analyzed carefully. For the purposes of this paper, 
the establ ishment of the rank order and mapping based upon the modified 
New York model has been deemed sufficient. 
With this geographic portrayal of the general economic health of 
Oregon, efforts can now follow to explore means of altering the estab-
1 ished economic patterns through State-directed programs aimed at dis-
persion of economic opportunities and population growth. 
15 
TABLE I 
PER CENT POPULATION GROWTH IN OREGON 
COUNTIES, 1960 - 1970 
RANK COUNTY 1970 1960 CHANGE PER CENT CHANGE 
34 BAKER 14,919 17,295 -2,376 -13.7 
3 BENTON 53,776 39,165 14,611 37.4 
2 CLACKAMAS 166,088 113,038 53,050 46.9 
21 CLATSOP 28,473 27,380 1,093 4.0 
7 COLUMBIA 28,790 22,379 6,411 28.6 
22 COOS 56,515 54,955 1,560 2.8 
17 'CROOK 9,985 9,430 555 5.9 
28 CURRY 13,006 13,983 -977 -7.0 
5 DESCHUTES 30,442 23,100 7,342 31.8 
19 DOUGLAS 71,743 68,458 3,285 4.8 
35 GILLIAM 2,342 3,069 -727 -23.6 
30 GRANT 6,996 7,726 -730 -9.5 
14 HARNEY 7,215 6,744 471 7.0 
26 HOOD RIVER 13,187 13,395 -208 -1.7 
8 JACKSON 94,533 73,962 20,571 27.8 
12 JEFFERSON 8,548 7,130 1,418 19:9 
13 JOSEPHINE 35,746 29,917 5,829 19.5 
18 KLAMATH 50,021 47,475 2,546 5.4 
31 LAKE 6,343 7,158 -815 -11.8 
6 LANE 213,358 162,890 50,468 31.0 
20 LINCOLN 25,755 24,635 1,120 4.5 
II LINN 71,914 58,867 13,047 22.2 
23 MALHEUR 23,169 22,764 405 1.8 
9 MARION 151,309 120,888 30,421 25.2 
29 MORROW 4,465 4,871 -406 -8.3 
16 MULTNOMAH 556,667 522,813 33,854 6.5 
4 POLK 35,349 26,523 8,826 33.2 
33 SHERMAN 2,139 2,446 -307 -12.5 
27 TILLAMOOK 17,930 18,955 -1,025 -5.4 
24 UMATILLA 44,923 44,352 571 1.3 
15 UNION 19,377 18,180 1,197 6.6 
32 WALLOWA 6,247 7,102 -855 -12.1 
25 WASCO 20,133 20,205 -72 -0.4 
1 WASHINGTON 157,920 92,237 65,683 71.2 
36 WHEELER 1,849 2,722 -873 -32.1 
10 YAMHILL 40,213 32,478 7,735 23.8 
State of Oregon 2,091,385 1,768,687 322,698 18.2 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 
of po~ulation: 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), 
PC(I)-C39. Changes calculated by the author. 
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TABLE II 
GROWTH IN 20-49 AGE GROUP IN OREGON COUNTIES 
1960 - 1970 
RANK COUNTY 1970 1960 CHANGE % CHANGE 
34 BAKER 4,695 6,045 -1,350 -22.3 
3 BENTON 23.906 16,429 7,477 45.5 
2 CLACKAMAS 62,014 40,938 21,076 51.5 
24 CLATSOP 9,202 9,625 -423 -4.4 
7 COLUMBIA 10,034 7,586 2,448 32.3 
22 COOS 20,299 21,197 -898 -4.2 
18 CROOK 3,504 3,521 -17 -0.5 
33 CURRY 4,332 5,448 -1,116 -20.5 
8 DESCHUTES 10,650 8,277 2,373 28.7 
19 DOUGLAS 25,548 25,778 -230 -0.9 
35 GILLIAM 819 1,216, -397 -32.6 
30 GRANT 2,384 2,849 -465 -16.3 
16 HARNEY 2,699 2,631 68 2.6 
28 HOOD RIVER 4,347 4,708 -361 -7.7 
9 JACKSON 33,664 26,647 7,017 26.3 
12 JEFFERSON 3,049 2,740 309 11.6 
13 JOSEPHINE 11,224 10,158 1,066 10.5 
17 KLAMATH 19,007 18,767 240 1.3 
32 LAKE 2,181 2,741 -560 -20.4 
6 LANE 83,869 63,151 20,718 32.8 
25 LINCOLN 7,918 8,396 -478 -5.7 
11 LINN 25,785 21,321 4,464 20.9 
23 MALHEUR 7,504 7,839 -335 -4.3 
4 MARION 61,495 42,613 18,882 44.4 
20 MORROW 1,431 1,727 -296 -1.7 
15 MULTNOMAH 205,727 192,317 13,410 7.0 
5 POLK 12,695 9,353 3,342 35.7 
27 SHERMAN 864 930 -66 -7.1 
29 TILLAMOOK 5,696 6,617 -921 -13.9 
21 UMATILLA 15,522 15,993 -471 -2.9 
14 UNION 6,786 6,337 449 7. I 
31 WALLOWA 2,051 2,549 -498 -19.5 
26 WASCO 6,915 7,434 -519 -7.0 
1 WASHINGTON 62,723 34,051 28,672 84.3 
36 WHEELER 619 1,027 -408 -39.7 
10 YAMHILL 13,443 10,741 2,702 25. 1 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Po~ulation: 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), 
PC(J)-C39. Changes calculated by the author. 
TABLE III 
PER CAPITA INCOME IN OREGON' 
COUNTIES, 1969 ~ 
RANK . ' COUNTY iNCOME -
34 
5 
3 
4 
17 
10 
25 
8" 
.9' 
23 
29 
33 
18 
13 
14 
30 
31 
11 
28 
7 
12. 
26 
36 
19 
,6 
2 
16 
27 
20· 
22 
21 
32 
,15 
l' 
35· 
24· 
BAKER' , 
BENTON 
CLACKAMAS 
CLATSOP 
COLUMBIA 
COOS 
CROOK 
CURRY 
DESCHUTES 
DOUGLAS 
GILLIAM 
GRANT 
HARNEY 
HOOD RIVER 
'JACKSON 
JEFFERSON 
. JOSEPHINE 
KLAMATH' " 
LAKE 
LANE ; 
LINCOLN 
LINN 
MALHEUR 
MARION 
MORROW 
MULTNOMAH 
POLK 
SHERMAN 
TILLAMOOK 
UMATILLA,: . 
UNION 
WALLOWA 
WASCO 
WASHINGTON 
WHEELER 
YAMHILL 
State of Oregon': 
'$2,585 
" 3,096 
3,423 
3,150 
2,868 
2,999, 
2,749 
3,022, 
J,OOO 
2,761 
2,625 
2,600 
2',856 
'2,887 
,2,884 
'"." 2,613 
2,609: ' 
'2,912 
2,628 ,'" 
," 3,045 
" 2,897.' " 
'2,719' 
·.2·,377 '. 
2,841" ~-'" 
'r3,071 
"3,547'-" 
2,870< 
2,638 ' 
2,843 . 
2,795 ,." 
2,813 .-", 
2,604 
. 2,877 '. 
3,723 
" '2,578 
2,754 
3,163. 
, .' 
, TABLE IV ' . 
. PER CENT PERSONS BELOW POVERTY 
INCOME IN OREGON COUNTIES,j969 
RANK' : PERCENTAGE 
34 16.7 
28~r: .' • 14.8 
2 -~ -~ ~.3 ~ 
, '25 "13.6 
7~r( _, 11 .0 
5 10.3 
7* 11.0 
22~rc '. 13 ~ 3 
·15 11.9 
22* • 13.3' 
3 8.9 
,'18 12.8 
4 9.2 
27 13.8 
:17· 12.6 
.28*, 14.8 
·.··35 <0 16.8 
<. 16 .: . 12.4.. 
31 ,15.0 '-" 
" , 9~'c .~ 11 • l' c .' 
28~'c: ", ".' "14.-8~ <.~";',, 
13 '··11.4, 
,36 20. 1. , 
, 19ic -- -' ','. '13 .0 . :' 
14 , _~ f"~ .. ~" I (.5 , ,.' 
, 12' 11 .3 r '-
26 13.7 
,32' ·,15.2 
24' .' 13;4. r 
, <, 21· ,.... 13. 1 
6 "'.' '.10 .• 8 
33 .' 15:i' ,.-c" 
'9 ic . ' .} 11 ~ 1 . 
'.1 ". 6.3-
" 9~'c, 11. 1 
) 9~'c . 1 3 .0'. 
11.5 
" 
.... 
: 
Note*: Where percentages were equalJ~t~e.same rankings ~ere given.-
" 
; . .-"
~ Source: U.S .. D~partm~~t of Commer~e, ~ureau of the 'Census, Census 
of population: 1970 (Washin'gton: ·U.S.,Government Prin~ing Office), 
. PC(J)-C39. ' .. 
'.' 
.,. 
, ,. 
.' .:>' , 
. :"-..~ ,.... ~, ' .. 
,,',; .' 
" ~,: 
" I 
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, TABLE V 
PER CENT INCREASE IN MEDIAN INCOME FOR FAMILIES 
AND UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS,'1959 - 1969 
~ COUNTY 1969 1959 CHANGE % CHANGE 
30 BAKER $6,228 $4,517 $1,711 37.9 
36 BENTON 3,722 3.635 87 2.4 
3 CLACKAMAS 9,409 5,532 3,877 70.0 
15 CLATSOP 6,633 4,523 2, 110 46.6 
1 COLUMBIA 8,260 4.709 3,551 75.4 
12 COOS 8,010 5,334 2,676 50.2 
25 CROOK 7.289 5.197 2,092 40.3 
31 CURRY 7,563 5,506 2,057 37.3 
II DESCHUTES 7,666 5,068 2,598 51.3 
17 DOUGLAS 7,730 5,299 2,431 45.9 
4 GILLIAM 7,451 4,425 3,026 68.4 
24 GRANT 7,007 4,976 2,031 40.8 
6 HARNEY 7,429 4,554 2,875 63.2 
21 HOOD RIVER 7,195 4,976 2,219 44.6 
28 JACKSON 6,918 4,982 1,936 38.9 
19 JEFFERSON 7,507 5,175 2,332 45.0 
32 JOSEPHINE 6,118 4.543 1,575 34.7 
26 KLAMATH 7.202 5.140 2,062 40.2 
33 LAkE 6,993 5.391 1,602 29.7 
27 LANE 7,309 5,227 2,082 39.8 
29 LINCOLN 6,244 4,513 1,731 38.4 
8 LINN 7,902 5,051 2,851 56.4 
18 MALHEUR 5,960 4,083 1,877 45.9 
9 MARION 7,250 4,646 2,604 56.2 
13 MORROW 7,160 4.823 2,337 48.3 
20 MULTNOMAH 7.527 5.205 2.322 44.7 
22 POLK 6,539 4,544 1,995 44.0 
35 SHERMAN 6,947 5.636 1,311 23.3 
16 TILLAMOOK 6,946 4,756 2,190 46.1 
23 UMATILLA 7,251 5,092 2,159 42.4 
7 UNION 6,720 4,200 2,520 60.0 
14 WALLOWA 6,915 4,402 2,513 47.1 
10 WASCO 8,001 5,223 2,'778 53.2 
2 WASHINGTON 10,083 5,863 4,220 72.2 
34 WHEELER 6,373 5,161 1,212 23.5 
4 YAMHILL 6,577 3,935 2.642 67.2 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Population: 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
PC(I)-39. Changes calculated by the author. 
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TABLE VI 
PER CENT GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT IN OREGON COUNTIES, 1965 - 1971 
!iilli!S COUNTY 1971 1965 CHANGE % CHANGE 
17 BAKER 2,691 2,320 371 16.0 
7 BENTON 8,948 6,891 2,057 29.8 
2 CLACKAMAS 24,083 16,752 7.331 43.7 
23 CLATSOP 6,429 5,940 489 8.2 
19 COLUMBIA 3,823 3,382 441 13. 1 
24 COOS 13 ,958 12,883 1,075 8. 1 
4 CROOK 2,630 1,878 752 40.0 
30 CURRY 2,829 2,904 
-75 -2.5 
6 DESCHUTES 7,054 5, 160 1,894 36.8 
29 DOUGLAS 16,195 16,587 
-392 -2.4 
35 GILLIAM 304 789 -485 -61.4 
8 GRANT 1,082 841 241 28.7 
27 HARNEY 1,492 1,494 -2 -0. 1 
21 HOOD RIVER 2,658 2,368 290 12.2 
11 JACKSON 20,422 16,677 3,745 22.5 
34 JEFFERSON 1,376 1,667 -291 -17.4 
25 JOSEPHINE 6,197 5,926 271 4.6 
16 KLAMATH 10,523 8,888 1,635 18.4 
33 LAKE 920 1,070 -150 -14.0 
22 LANE 50,214 46,099 4,115 8.9 
28 LINCOLN 4,867 4,979 -112 -2.3 
12 LINN 17,530 14,348 3, 182 22.2 
14 MALHEUR 5,420 4,475 945 21.1 
13 MARION 29,060 23,892 5,168 21.6 
9 MORROW 438 345 93 26.9 
15 MULTNOMAH 227,100 188,776 38.324 20.3 
18 POLK 4,784 4,144 640 15.4 
36 SHERMAN 172 506~'," -334 -66.0 
20 TILLAMOOK 3,312 2,945 367 12.5 
10 UMATILLA 8,478 6,845 1,633 23.9 
3 UNION 3,817 2,705 1, 112 41.1 
31 WALLOWA 646 698 -52 -7.4 
26 WASCO 3,848 3,794 54 1.4 
1 WASHINGTON 28,076 18,451 9,625 52.2 
32 WHEELER 283 325 -42 -12.9 
5 YAMHILL "7,441 5,320 2, 121 40.0 
Note*: 1964 employment is shown, as 1965 employment was substan-
tially inflated by construction projects. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Count~ Business Patterns: 1965 and 1971 
Printing Office). 
(Washington: U.S. Government 
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TABLE VII 
PER CENT INCREASE, VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE, 1963 - 1967 (Thousands of Dollars) 
~ COUNTY 1967 1963 CHANGE % CHANGE 
8 BAKER 9,000 6,400 2,600 40.6 
16 BENTON 28,400 22,100 6,200 2B.0 
13 CLACKAMAS 109,900 Bl,200 2B,700 3S.4 
10 CLATSOP 36,100 26,100 10,000 3B.3 
22 COLUMBIA 32,SOO 31,900 600 1.9 
20 COOS 79,800 69,200 10,600 IS.3 
3 CROOK IS;300 B,800 6,Soo 74.0 
23 CURRY 22,200 22,300 -100 -O.S 
5 DESCHUTES 20,100 13,500 6,600 48.8 
17 DOUGLAS 103,SOO 83,300 20,200 24.2 
GILLIAM 0 100 
28 GRANT 2,700 5,200 -2,500 -48.2 
HARNEY 0 0 
lB HOOD RIVER 13,000 10,900 2.100 19.3 
15 JACKSON 77,600 59,BOO 17.BOO 29.B 
JEFFERSON 0 7,600 
19 JOSEPHINE 30,000 25,600 4.400 17.2 
11 KLAMATH 36, 100 26,200 9.900 37.4 
24 LAKE 5.500 6,300 -Boo -12.7 
21 LANE 20B,200 183,600 24,600 13.4 
27 LINCOLN 17,700 24.200 -6,500 -26.9 
4 LINN 111.900 72,500 39,400 54.4 
MALHEUR 22,700 0 
14 MARION 89,700 68,500 21,200 30.9 
MORROW 2,200 0 
9 MULTNOMAH 650,800 470,100 180.700 3B.4 
25 POLK 31.600 36,600 -5;000 -13.7 
SHERMAN z 0 
6 TILLAMOOK 19,BOO 13.500 6,300 46.7 
7 UMATILLA 35,800 24,800 11,000 44.4 
1 UNION 14,600 6,600 8,000 121.2 
29 WALLOWA 2.500 5,100 -2,600 -51.0 
26 WASCO 23,400 27,900 -4,500 -16.1 
2 WASHINGTON 168,200 86,700 81,500 94.1 
WHEELER 0 0 
12 YAMHILL 25,900 19,100 6,800 35.6 
D = Information withheld to avoid disclosure for individual firms. 
Z = Less than $50.000. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Manufactures: 1963 and 196 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office. Calculations by the author. 
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TABLE VIII 
PER CENT GROWTH IN RETAIL SALES IN OREGON COUNTIES, 1963 - 1967 
(Thousands of Dollars) 
RANK COUNTY 1967 1963 CHANGE % CHANGE 
1 BAKER 29,788 20,667 9, 121 44.1 
9 BENTON 64,370 49, 185 15,185 30.9 
4 CLACKAMAS 167,131 122,227 44,904 36.7 
12 CLATSOP 48,580 38, 185 10,395 27.2 
2 COLUMBIA 29,455 20,833 8,622 41.4 
26 COOS 84,837 74,660 10,177 13.6 
32 CROOK 11,876 11,849 30 0.3 
30 CURRY 17,303 16,911 392 2.3 
18 DESCHUTES 53,275 43,861 9,414 21.4 
27 DOUGLAS 92,035 82,586 9,449 11.4 
31 GILLIAM 5,324 5,218 106 2.0 
16 GRANT 10,612 8,502 2,110 24.8 
7 HARNEY 12,913 9,692 3,221 33.3 
21 HOOD RIVER 22,891 19,377 3,514 18.1 
13 JACKSON 152,786 120,645 32,141 26.6 
33 JEFFERSON 16,611 16,582 29 0.2 
25 JOSEPHINE 55,439 48,586 6,853 14.1 
28 KLAMATH 83,549 75,009 8,540 11.4 
19 LAKE 13,601 11,299 2,302 20.4 
20 LANE 316,281 267,049 49,232 18.4 
17 LINCOLN 39,485 31,833 7,652 24.0 
10 LINN 99,389 78,056 21,333 27.3 
22 MALHEUR 42,556 36,490 6,066 16.6 
8 MARION 254,054 191,262 62,792 32.8 
34 MORROW 6,803 6,966 -163 -2.3 
11 MULTNOMAH 1,161,226 912,442 248,784 27.3 
15 POLK 29,718 23,799 5,919 24.9 
36 SHERMAN 2,465 2,894 -429 -14.8 
23 TILLAMOOK 23,209 19,995 3,214 16.0 
14 UMATILLA 83,149 65,952 17,197 26.1 
6 UNION 29,881 22,104 7,777 35.2 
3 WALLOWA 8,554 6,145 2,409 39.2 
24 WASCO 42,927 37,386 5,541 14.8 
5 WASHINGTON 187,338 138,617 48,721 35.2 
35 WHEELER 1,584 1,814 -230 -12.7 
29 YAMHILL 45,906 40,659 5,247 11.3 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Business Reta i 1 Trade: 1963 and 196 (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Calculations by the author. 
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TABLE IX 
ANNUAL AVERAGE TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
BY COUNTY OR LABOR MARKET AREAS 
1962 - 1971 
COUNTY OR 
LABOR MAR- lO-yr. 
~ KET AREA 1962 1963 1964 ~ 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Ave. 
8 BAKER 8.6 6.2 5;3 5.0 3.8 4.9 4.8 5.4 7.1 6.4 5.75 
2 BENTON 4.5 3.8 4.1 4.0 3.8 4. 1 3.7 3.9 4.9 5.2 4.20 
17 CLATSOP 7.6 8.0 6.6 5.3 5.1 5.7 5.4 5.4 6.2 7.8 6.31 
15 COLUMBIA 7.1 7. 1 6.1 5.5 5.2 5.8 5.4 5.4 7.2 7.4 6.22 
27 COOS 6.7 6.7 6.9 7.6 6.7 8.0 6.9 7.4 8.2 9.1 7.42 
21 CROOK 6.4 6.4 7.0 6.0 6.9 6.6 4.6 6.7 8.4 7.6 6.66 
18 CURRY 6.4 6.8 6.7 5.6 5.5 '6.0 5.5 7.4 8. 1 7.4 6.54 
18 DESCHUTES 6.9 6.2 5.9 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.4 5.3 7.2 6.3 6.54 
22 DOUGLAS 5.9 5.7 5.0 6.7 7.6 8.9 6.1 6.4 7.9 7.3 6.15 
6 GILLIAM 7.4 4.6 4.3 4.5 5.3 6.7 7.9 5.4 5.3 5.6 5.70 
8 GRANT 6.8 5.5 7.5 6.2 5.9 5. 1 4.8 4.5 6.0 5.6 5.79 
1 HARNEY 4.4 3.8 4. 1 3.7 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.8 5.2 5.1 3.95 
29 HOOD RIVER 9.4 8.1 7.3 7.0 6.6 7. 1 7.3 7.0 8. 1 8.4 7.63 
20 JACKSON 5.6 5.6 5.9 5.8 6.2 7.4 6.3 7.0 8.5 7.6 6.59 
16 JEFFERSQN 5.7 4.3 5.9 6.0 6.3 7.2 6.4 5.2 8.0 8.0 6~30 
31 JOSEPHINE 9.4 8.4 8.2 8.0 8.7 10.3 8.5 10.7 12.2 11.4 9.58 
9 KLAMATH 6.9 6.3 6.3. 5.7 5.4 6.0 4.7 4.7 6.2 6.4 5.86 
28 LAKE 8.2 6. 1 .7.8 8.1 8.2 8.3 7.0 6.4 8.0 7.0 7.51 
7 LANE 5.4 5.4 5.2 4.8 5.4 6.2 5.1 5.6 7.0 7.2 5.73 
23 LINCOLN 7.7 6.8 6.8 6.2 6.5 7.0 5.7 6.2 7.9 7.8 6.86 
13 LINN 6.6 5.9 5.9 5.3 5.6 6.9 5.3 5.1 7.3 7.4 6. 13 
5 MALHEUR' LMA 6.5 6.6 6.0 4.7 4.3 4.2 5. 1 4.5 4.8 6.2 5.29 
14 MORROW 7.2 7. 1 5.6 6.1 4.6 6.5 4.1 5.7 6.8 7.9 6.16 
3 PORTLAND 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.0 3.3 4.0 3.6 3.5 5.6 6.1 4.~7 
LMA 
12 SALEM LMA 6.5 6.4 6.6 5.8 5.5 6.2 5.6 ,5· , 6.6 6.8 6. 11 
26 SHERMAN - 8. 1 7.0 8.5 6.1 6.3 8.3 7.4 7. I 7.8 7.3 7.39 
WASCO LMA 
10 TILLAMOOK 7.1 5.6 5.4 5. 1 4.9 4.9 4.9 6. 1 7.5' 7.2 5.87 
11 UMATILLA 6.3 6.7 6.4 5.5 4.1 5.0 4.7 6.9 6.5 7.2 5.93 
4 UNION 6.2 5.7 5.0 3.8 4.9 .4.0 4.6 4.9 6.8 6.5 5.24 
25 WALLOWA 9.9 5.6 8.0 6.8 4.2 5.6 6.4 6.8 7.5 9.5 7.03 
24 WHEELER 8.2 7.3 6.2 7.5 6.9 6.8 6.0 6.0 7.5 7.6 7.00 
30 YAMHILL 10.1 10.0 9.2 7.9 6.9 7.5 6.5 6.4 9.8 9.8 8.41 
State of Oregon: 5.5 5.1 5.0 4.6 4.2 4.8 4.4 4.4 5.9 6.3 5.02 
Source: CompJ1ed at the request of the author by the Research and 
Statistics Department, Oregon Employment Division: July 28, 1972. 
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TABLE X 
COMPOSITE OF RANKS 
RANK COUNTY Q.UARTILE ~ #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 
25 BAKER III 34 34 34 34 30 17 8 1 8 
10 BENTON II 3 3 5 28 36 7 16 9 2 
2 CLACKAMAS I 2 2 3 2 3 2 13 4 3 
15 CLATSOP II 21 24 4 25 15 23 10 12 17 
5 COLUMBIA I 7 7 17 7 1 19 22 2 15 
20 COOS. III 22 22 10 5 12 24 20 26 27 
16 CROOK II 17 18 25 7 25 4 3 32 21 
31 CURRY IV 28 33 8 22 31 30 23 30 18 
4 DESCHUTES I 5 8 9 15 II 6 5 18 18 
23 DOUGLAS III 19 19 23 22 17 29 17 27 22 
26 GILLIAM III 35 35 29 3 4 35 31 6 
23 GRANT III 30 30 33 18 24 8 28 16 8 
7 HARNEY I 14 16 18 4 6 27 7 I 
28 HOOD RIVER IV 26 28 13 27 21 21 18 21 29 
12 JACKSON II 8 9 14 17 28 11 15 13 20 
29 JEFFERSON IV 12 12 30 . 28 19 34 33 16 
32 JOSEPHINE IV 13 13 31 35 32 25 19 25 31 
16 KLAMATH II 18 17 II 16 26 16 11 28 9 
34 LAKE IV 31 32 28 31 33 33 24 19 28 
11 LANE II 6 6 7 9 27 22 21 20 7 
30 LINCOLN IV 20 25 12 28 29 28 27 17 23 
9 LINN I 11 11 26 13 8 12 4 10 13 
27 MALHEUR III 23 23 36 36 18 14 22 5 
8 MARION I 9 4 19 19 9 13 14 8 12 
19 MORROW III 29 20 6 14 13 9 34 14 
6 MULTNOMAH I 16 15 2 12 20 15 9 11 3 
13 POLK II 4 5 16 26 22 18 25 15 12 
36 SHERMAN IV 33 27 27 32 35 36 36 26 
21 TILLAMOOK III 27 29 20 24 16 20 6 23 10 
18 UMATILLA II 24 21 22 21 23 10 7 14 11 
3 UNION I 15 14 21 6 7 3 I 6 4 
33 WALLOWA IV 32 31 32 33 14 31 29' 3 25 
22 WASCO III 25 26 15 9 10 26 26 24 26 
1 WASHINGTON I 1 I 1 1 2 1 2 5 3 
35 WHEELER IV 36 36 35 9 34 32 35 24 
13 YAMHILL II 10 10 24 19 4 5 12 29 30 
1. % Population Growth, 1960 - 1970. 
2. % Growth in 20-49 Age Group, 1960 - 1970. 
3. Per Capita Income, 1969. 
4. % Persons Below Poverty Livel of Income, 1969. 
5. % Increase in Median Income, Famil ies & Unrelated Individuals, 
1959 - 1969. 
6. % Growth in Employment, 1965 - 1971. 
7. % Increase, Value Added by Manufacture, 1963 - 1967. 
8. % Growth in Retail Sales, 1963 - 1967.· 
9. Average Total Unemployment Rates, 1962 - 1971. 
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. CHAPTER .II I l 
TYPES OF SUBSIDIES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION, 
With this prel iminary analysis of.the.econ6mi~ and social benefits 
" . 
". . t 
that might be sought fo.r Oregon through an in"dustrial :subsidy,program',' 
we ca,9 now consider:- what types <;?f subsidies might be emp'loyed and." 
attempt to evaluate t~eir ef~ects. For" (llustrati~e purposes, an 
" 12 an~lysis cited,by Richardson will be useful .. 
The model he' examines was·developed by G. H. Borts to show the 
, . ~ 
relative advantages of three different k!nds of subsidy: labor, capii~1 
and prices. The model measures the cost·of a 'subsi~y as 'a soci~1 cost;·~ 
defined as the output forego~e by diverting capital "fro!fl its most pro-',: 
. - ' .. 
" ',., 
ductive u~e,· rather'than a monetary cost which is'simply a transf~r., 
. . 
The aim is to con'sider the,most efficient short-run method of securing 
'full employment wIth)n a'r'egion' by. comparing the 's'ocial':rate of·re,turn., .. 
• ~ '-, ~ , '··'r--.. 
from the, three types of subsJdy. The'~bde'l assumes an' inelastic supply 
cu'rve fo-r 1 abor .. ' treat i ng .i t. 'as a fixed' ~esol!rce" and' a pe rfect I y . 
.' , . , ' , . . 
elastic s,uppl.y c!Jrve fo~ capital, which makes' this' the'v~'rfab-re factor ........ ; 
The model al~o,assumes that the marginal revenueprod~ct of lab6r 
." .. ;- -, ," ~ ... 
in the region's' comp,~titive' industry aecl ines due to a decre'ase in the,'~ . 
., ',; 
price of tha~. indl,Jstryi,s output",:b.ut that wages are rigid and fai'l to 
decl ine to'an equil ibr'ium level. This causes, the industr'y'to. leave the' 
, , 
region, which then becomes characterized by 'a 'discrepancy between' the., 
. l,2R i ~hardso~, op. cit., pp. 405-409. 
. '.,. ~ 
.' ,.' 
" ... \ I 
',.' . 
" ' .. ' .. 
":c" t 
• ! 
. " 
." ," 
.' .: 
,7 • 27 
private and soci~l costs of 'labor', - The priyate' cost is th~ fixed wage, 
" 
while the social cost- is the product.ivity of labor 'in the' industry in 
compet it ive equ i 1 ibrJuril, 
Borts considers three forms of Intervention to ~Ilevlate'this dis-
crcpancy: I) a wage subs'idy, whereby the "government suos'idlzesempl~yer's 
. r' .' , 
',the difference between the old and ~ew marginal product of , labor; 2) a 
~capital s~bsidy, with' wh'ich '~mpJoyer·s·,are paid' the' difference betwee~ '. 
. ;,
,the c:;:ompet i tive rate o'f retu'rri on investment and the return 'earned after' 
the price decl ine' (through low lnt'erest, foans. tax reI ief or cheap ,she ;:~ 
and factory' rents); 'and 3) '~price'subs'idy, where th~:indust~y's output<' 
1S subsidized hy paym~nt of theodifference between the old and the new 
price of output. -. -- .... ~, 7 
<. 
+. 'A' __ 
The analysis es,timates .the-:social rate of return from each of. 
thes'e policies. ,'Since .i,t was~-~ssumed that ind~stry would Teave.'the--·-'.-:. 
region withou~ subsidies. then·the sociar-return ~o th~ subsidy i! the 
full 'output of ~hat industrV. 'the cost ~o the ~ub~idy is the output 
, '~ . 
lost by transfe~ring mobile capital re~ourcesinto' the ind~~tr~,-measured_" 
by the ou~puf sacrifi~~d: in. 'other uses' wi~th 
. , - ~. - : " ' ~ ,- ~ -
capital: (opportunity cost) ...... ,. 
, ,,-..':. 
Bor,ts c9ncl\I'des' that the wage' 's~bsidy is'~fhe best:of the three,' 
" 
,policies 'i,n terms of_social return','· .Seektng fulJemploymen't as the ' 
J _ .• -" . _ 'e, 
;- .. 
objective, a,direct wage,subsidy encourages maximum utili.zation of the', 
labor resource ~ydecreasing the direct labor cost to the .indust~y, The 
.- . . ,~ ~ -
'." 
higher the elasticity of substitution ~etween labor and capital, the 
:greater the returns from thi,s p~1 icy, as ~i~dust"ry~i'll,be'e'ncouraged to 
employ more labor ii'l"relati'on to its 'capltal expendi.tu'res. Thrs wou·lo· 
. .", . ' .~~ 
always be true except in.the case ~here a flx~d.labor-capital ratip: .. ," 
, . , 
, ,., 
, J . ", 
. ".~' 
, . 
" 
, 
" . 
exists and the percentage declIne in output price is greate,r than the 
'share p~ i d to labor"." " 
If:capita'l subsidies 'are"~sed, their effe,ctis to.inc·rease the 
capital-Iabo~ ratio in order to increase, thecmarginal physical output 
. ' 
.... '-
of 1 abor. The prJ ce de'c line ,:w6u I d t,h~n b'e offset by th i s i n~rease i"-
the ma.rgina! physical output 'of, labo~:~h,ile ,thee margin~I":revenue product 
~ .... , ,,.....; ~ . ~J 
of labor remains, unchanged. ',This ,allows ithe industry to pay the 
, . ? ,~ , 
'"'. \ ~ ~. \ - . . 
original. wage" while earning ,the, original~rateof ret~rn to 'jts own 
capital'investment. 
) , " 
return as the wage subsidy i,'ut at the higher cost o~' transferring'more 
, " 
capital out,of ot:her, more product'ive uSeS. 
. , 
With price subsidies, both'i'n'Hial 'output and capital are left 
, 
unc,hanged. This also 'w'ill permit. ~he, i'ndustry"to reta'in its ~riginal"'::,,'~ 
employment level . .It does,s'o, however;::through' animp.l ied. artif'iCial ' 
rise in the value productivity 9f capi~a~, ~reated ~y 's~bsidizing the" 
, , 
>' , , , 
Ag'a in, the:" cap i ta I, ·resou rce ,'is o~ve r va I ued, res'u It i ng,', , p rice of outpu,t. 
in higher sqcia! costs due to the transfer of'capita'! f,rom'more pro"-
ductive uses. 
It would 'appear'that one of the primary determinants ,,of the 
effectiveness of thes'e three policy alt~rnatives 'is'th~ subs.titut~bilitY' 
of labor and capital. I~ a fixed rati~ exists, then capital arid 'p~ice ~', 
, . ~ . " ,...,. ~ " \' . -' - . 
subsidies become relatively'more attr~ctive. "But C!s"the s~bstitut-'" . 
~. ~ • " ", '. I. ~ ~ " - , I. - , • ~, 
ab iIi ty ~f labor' for' cap ita I i ~creases~: then the wage subs i,dy wi il,' , " ' : . 
, 
. . ... . ~ 
produce a,higher'retu~n by withdrawing less capital, from 'other useS.'. 
, . 
This will result in a,higher ,level of "total'outpu,t .for',the region" 
Wh i Ie th i s type of an~ I ys i s ,I s somewhat the~rE3t kal " 'espe,c ian y 
in terms of the pr~ctital alternatives a~ailable ~o p~bl i~ agencies, 
, :.$ ;:', L' -. . ' 
;' j ,f 
t ,r 
=:. '" '. 
" .1<. 
it does produce some useful insights into how different types of sub-
sidies will vary in their effects on regional development. In partic-
ular, it shows that there is more to consider than the employment and 
output gained by the subsidized plants. 
While the Borts model may be limited in its applicabil ity to 
29 
Oregon because of its structural assumptions, some comparisons can still 
be made. For example, the assumption of a price decl ine for the region's 
industrial output can be compared to the historical situation of agri-
culture where there has been a price decl ine relative to other industries. 
That condition, along with the increased substitutabil ity of capital for 
labor in agriculture and a rising marginal revenue product of capital 
over labor, would create a situation very comparable to that described 
by Borts. If we can also assume imperfect mobil ity of labor in the 
agricultural areas, then the effect would be a reduction in income levels 
along with rising unemployment. As Seen .in the last chapter, this is 
the condition that prevails in much of rural Oregon. 
The industrial subsidy progr~ms being prescribed to correct 
Oregon's imbalances would generally fall into the category of capital 
subsidies. It is assumed that by the vehicle of expanding regional 
productive capacity and output, the variety of economic and social 
goals, such as population shifts and employment of surplus labor, can 
be achieved. As mentioned earlier, however, such policies will have an 
effect on resource allocations and there is some question as to whether 
an efficient allocation can be achieved which will produce the desired 
objectives. This problem will now be examined in greater detail. 
As stated earlier, a major problem in the resource allocation 
question relates to the geographical area in which the benefits of the 
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subsidy program are measured. One criticism of such programs is that 
by influencing a firm to locate in one place ~ather than ~nother, there 
is no real net gain in output to compensate for the publ ic investment 
and economic shocks caused by competitive bidding for the plant. Accord-
ing to this hypothesis, a plant will be built for a specific production 
capacity, determined by the nature of the market and the firm's com-
petitive position in that market, so regardless of where it is built 
the output will be the same. Under this hypothesis, industrial subsidy 
programs have been referred to as the IIzero-sum game". 
The type of criticism expressed in the zero-sum hypothesis results 
from broadening the scope of analysis from the local level to a more 
regional or national overview. The complaint lodged against community 
efforts to. attract industry through financial and tax inducements is 
that the practice is self-defeating in the sense that it induces other 
communities to do I ikewise. The alleged result of this rivalry is 
that one community's gain is offset by another's loss. 
This zero-sum concept is also modified somewhat by the claim that 
the loss of a plant to one community, with its resultant effects of 
throwing people out of work and decreasing income flows, is too great 
a price to pay for some other community to gain a new plant.' Therefore, 
whether we are considering new plants or relocations, the concept of 
industrial subsidies is viewed as producing either zero or negative 
results when considered in a broad perspective. 
This criticism, if it is val id, could have an important bearing 
on policy decisions in Oregon. Even if a purely self-interest pol icy 
should be adopted, so that the negative effects of industrial subsidies 
in other areas of the country are ignored, there would exist the 
, , 
possibility that other stateS would'adppt a similar, course and Induce 
Or~gon f t rills to loavo tho ~tate. "'The summary·.'of progra~s given In 
"... ~ " ' ... ~W.·· '" 
the ~ppend ix' i ~d i cate? .that th is i'sa 1 ready- be i n,g done h'y, ~~s t other 
'states, however. Stin, there mi9ht._'als~ exist the possibilit(that. 
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a' 1 oca 1 subs i dy pr.ogram in Oregon wou' d produce the effect of re 1 ocat i"g , . 
firms within the state, in which case ,the State government would have 
to c;onsider both the"positive and'negati'{o effects o~ those programs •. 
.. ~ - - '. 
The subJect then becomes a serious consideration in assessing the 
political, as well as the econpmic and social. implications of-subsidy 
programs. 
The zero-sum 'concept, and it~.cri'tjcisms~ was des~ribed by'the'-
,example of ,a case hi'stoFY which occurfediri 1961. Ac:.cording to. one, 
report,13 the ~anage~e~t' of' the'Nor~~.Division of the Borg-Warner 
Corporation in Muskegan, Michigan, suddenly announced plans-to~Cclose' 
,its plant there. No advance 'notice was given ,to the p'antl~ 1400 
... J 
workers, who had spent an '~verage of. 15 years worki'ng for the' 'company. t. 
Almost 900 of thes~~workers 'were,over 40'yea'7s old, while '235 were over' 
·55 years ·of age--an age group whiCh'norm~lly has great-difficulty" 
" . 
find i ng new jobs. ~. . ", 
" At the same,time this .announcement was made in Muskegan; ,which 
was already designated .a'labor su~'plus area, the same firm--N'<?rge·olv-.. · . 
. Ision of Borg-Warnet--announced that it wo~jd builc!a new manufactu.ring. 
/ ,,' ~ ."'" 
plant at Greenwood, Arkansas, 70.0 miles away .. The new, $7.S'.niHLion, 
'.'* 
·faci 1 itywould ,be financed b'y the pr'7ceeds frQm the sa~e of tax-free 
13· '.
F"ran.k L. F"ernback, IlSubsidized Plant Migration," American· ' 
F"ederationist, Vol. 73. July" 1966, pp. 8-12. '. 
> ~ •• , 
... 
, 
. '. 
32 
d The report Soundly condemned this and all other forms municipal bon s. 
of subsidized plant migration. 
The report failed to consider any reasonS why the plant at Muske-
gan was being closed or to explore any reasons why the firm was relocat-
ing its facility. It assumed that the cost advantages of the subsidy 
were the only determining factor. 
Noneth~less, this kind of example warrants a further look into the 
net effects of the induced location of industry. EVen where subsidies 
are used to attract new plants rather than relocations, the criticism 
that a plant gained in one area is offset by that plant not being gained 
in another area is worthy of consideration. 
An examination into this question is· provided by Rinehart and 
Laird. 14 They based their analysis on the assumption that full-employ-
ment communities will make less use of industrial subsidies than will 
depressed communities with labor surpluses. State programs which seek 
to shift industrial investment to depressed areas would normally fit 
such an assumption. The effect of the subsidies, then will be to 
increase the net flow of capital into the labor-surplus (capital-scarce) 
regions. More capital will become available in the region than would 
otherwise be the case as new firms and branch plants are attracted. 
This means that for the region as a whole, the competition for industry 
does not have a cancelling-out effect, even if it may appear to do so 
for individual communities within the region. 
The study also considers some of the justification criteria 
14 
J. R. Rinehart and W. E. Laird, IICommunity Inducements to Indus-
try and the Zero-Sum Game," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 19. (February, 1972). 73-90. 
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mentioned by Richardson, including the possibility that on a regional 
level the shift in capital flows may leave overall levels of employment 
and income unchanged, but finds that: " ... the benign zero-sum outcome 
allows a broader range of choice for individual preferences regarding 
location and life-style and in that respect promotes an increase in 
15 
social welfare." 
Another relevant finding, from the aspect of state policies and 
goals, is that an increased capital inflow into underemployment regions 
may slow the forced migration into the larger urban centers and thereby 
promote an overall pattern of resource allocation which will make the 
interrelated problems of congestion and pollution more amenable to 
solution. These last two considerations were among the specific goals 
stated in the justification for a subsidy program in Oregon by the Senate 
Task Force on Economic Development. 
By looking at the problem in this manner, and assuming that sub-
sidies are, in fact, used to promote capital flows to areas of need, it 
would appear that industrial inducements do produce a net overall gain, 
at least in terms of thelr social benefits. Thus, the zero-sum hypo-
thesis, that one plant cance.ls out another, can be questioned. However, 
there is still the economic question of whether the industrial subsidy 
program would result in reallocation of resources to less efficient uses, 
thereby lowering overall levels of output. This question is compounded 
by the further argument that the new, subsidized firm will compete for 
inputs locally to the degtee that ita subsidies enable it to flourish. 
Even where local unemployment is considerable before the new plant is 
, 1 5lb i d, p. 81. 
attracted, already employed resources will be used to some degree and 
eVen the use of formerly unemployed factors of production will affect 
16 
the price of factors employed by other firms. 
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This criticism has been extended to include the theory that the 
misal10cat ion of resources resulting from subsidizing industrial loca-
tions in depressed areas actually leads to a net decrease in the econo-
mic level of the region. The basis of this argument is that resources 
are less productive in the depressed areas. which is why they are 
characterized by higher unemployment in the first place. 
Peter Drucker makes this point when he criticizes Britain's 
policies of subsidizing industrial migration to less developed areas. 
He states that: 
The depressed areas policy in Great Britain dates back to 
the twenties. In all that time it has not restored to econ-
omic health one single 'depressed area.' But it has effec-
tively penalized the shift of labor to areas of higher pro-
ductivity, higher wages and better jobs. It nas thereby 
slowed growth in the healthy regions. Yet whenever it is 
real ized that the 'depressed areas' are still depressed, the 
budget goes up. That the Swedes, faced with a similar 
problem, actually got rid of their 'depressed areas' by sub-
sidizing migration of labor out of them rather than, as the 
British do, migration of inefficient industry into them, is 
well known in England. But it has made no impression on 
government or public in Britain.17 
This pessimistic view is 1 imited, of course, by his reference to 
"inefficient" industries. If the subsidies represent an offset against 
other higher cost factors attendant to the location, then the concept of 
i neff i c i ency cannot be assumed. The next chapter w ill rev Lew the types 
of companies most frequently attracted by industrial subSidies and, at 
least in the American caSe studies, document that they cannot normally 
l7peter Drucker, The Age of Discontinuitv (New York: Harper & R 1969), p. 228 - , ow, 
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be classified as inefficient. 
There is another reason, also, why the British experience is not 
val id for estimating resource allocation effects from subsidy programs 
in the United States. While British programs provide positive incentives 
for industrial locations to depressed areas, including the construction 
of low-cost facil ities, their system suppliments this with disincentives 
for location· in developed areas. The primary disincentive is the re-
quirement that firms obtain an Industrial Development Certificate (IDC) 
as a precondition to their being permitted to establish a new facility. 
By denying i~suance of an IDC in a developed area, the Board of Trade 
can force the firm to either abandon its plans or locate in an ineffi-
18 
cient area. 
The result of this program has been less than satisfactory for the 
firms as well as for the depressed regions. According to the Board of 
Trade: 
.• it is reasonable to suppose that the large majority 
of firms which have gone to an unemployment area as tenants 
of Board of Trade factories, or with financial assistance, 
would not have done so had they been able to get an IDC in 
the place of their choice. No doubt firms urgently needing 
finance would be ready to set up on a development district 
in return for financial assistance, but these are in general
19 not the firms that are I ikely to give continuing employment. 
It would appear that attaching disincentives to a subsidy program 
creates justifiable criticism of both the effectiveness of the program 
and its impact upon the efficiency of resource allocation. EVen the 
social benefits of such a program might be negated jf the result is the 
18Wesley C. Ballaine, "British Experience in Influencing Location 
of Industry," Western Economic Journal, Vol. IV (Summer, 1966), 237-46. 
19·rh I . d . e Po IC an Practice of the British Government for Deal in 
With L I U I oca nemp oyment London: Board of Trade, 19 0 , p. 12. 
inefficient location of marginal firms which fail to give permanent 
20 
employment. 
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Rather than considering general izations about resource allocations, 
it would be bettor to review tho type of subsidy employed and surround-
In9 oconomlc conditions In dotermlnlng the resource allocation effects 
in a particular subsidy situation. Regarding the labor resource, for 
example, different effects are shown for situations where the labor is 
mobile versus those where it is immobile. In Gray's analysis of these 
situations, he observed that: 
With respect to community financed subsidies to industry, the 
following can generally be concluded: 
1. If labor is immobile with respect to wages, employment and 
real income in the economy as a whole will be expanded in a 
manner consistent with the requirements for optimum resource 
allocation regardless of the financing techniques employed by 
the community. 
2. If labor is mobile with respect to wages, employment and 
income will rise, but the spatial distribution of resources 
will be inc~?sistent with the requirements for optimum resource 
allocation. 
Gray further maintains that while workers shift locations in order 
to obtain employment, the greatest part of structural unemployment in 
the United States consists of wage-immobile workers--redundant farmers 
and women in areas of low female labor force participation rates. Thus, 
he says that: " it is conceivable that the majority of industrial 
20 
An example would be a case in Roseburg, Oregon, where a local 
development corporation was establ ished to sell stock to finance a mobile 
home manufacturing plant. The plant closed after I~ss than two years 
operation, leaving the local stockholders to carry the costs of the empty 
facil ity and returning unemployment to a high level. 
21Ralph Gray, "Industrial Development Subsidies and Efficiency in 
Resource Allocation," National Tax Journal, Vol. 17, (June, 1964), 170. 
development subsidies--past, present and future--have improved overall 
resource allocation. tl22 
Gray recognizes that a subs~dy program could also be used to 
encourage outmigration as a means to overcome rigidities in labor im-
mobil ity. He points out, however, that there are economic and social 
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costs attached to this, also. He claims that the poverty and resulting 
social problems of migrants from the nation's labor-surplus areas are 
carried with them when they relocate into a labor-scarce area. This 
has the effect of increasing the costs of providing social overhead in 
the urban areas. 
These considerations are discussed by Morss in a different manner.23 
He acknowledges Gray's argument but says that the competitive market 
for new plants is similar to the competitive market for labor resources. 
Thus, ,in a competitive subsidy situation, the plant will locate where it 
has the highest value to the subsidizing conununity. This will produce 
a net benefit regardless of whether the labor moves with the plant or is 
recruited from the local ranks of unemployment. 
There is also reason to doubt the assumption that subsidized alter-
ations in resource allocations means moving away from an optimum free 
market condition. Cumberland and Van Beek observed that there are many 
economic and non-economic barriers which prevent the free flow of 
h t h b · d . t " t . d 24 Th d . .. resources weer su Sl Iza Ion IS prac Ice or not. e Iscrlmlnate 
22 Ibid , p. 171 
23EIl iott R. Morss, liThe Potentials of Competitive Subsidization," 
Land Economics, Vol. 63 (May, 1966), pp. 161-169. 
24J . H. Cumberland and Frits Van Beek, "Regional Economic Develop-
ment Objectives and Subsidization of Local Industry," Land Economics, 
Vol. 63 (August, 1967), p. 257. 
use of subsidies may act to remove these barriers: In any ca~e,' they 
conclude, it would be difficult to support the contention that an 
, , 
,"optimal" allocation will ,occur. if sfJbsidies ~re not employed. 
Richardson makes the same point. He.ob,serves that technological 
changes, variations in factor c~sts, etc,.', wilLtend to alter the" 
avera'ge cost re,lationsh,ips bet,ween various locations OVer t'ime. He, 
'states that: "Location decisions based on present data and/or 'on 
", 
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,assumptions that'the,present can be ,extrapolate~ ihto the fuiure will be-
unl ikely to maximize p~ofits in the long'run. 1I25 He therefo're conc1uces' .. , 
that: 
.. it'is un.1ikely that many firms will'make' sophisticated 
calculations in conjunction with crystal-gazing. It is much 
,more probable that firms', in full recognition of future changes_.: 
- 'ih spatial costs and pri~es and the difficu~ties of measuring 
" external economies, will not go to extreme 'Iengthsto find the 
',most profitable location, but instead will opt for a location 
that Seems viable in the long run 'and rely on increasin'g effl'--
ciency in other respects to raise their profitabiHty.26, ,'-
, . .. ", ~ ... .~ .... 
So' the concept of a single" optimu~la'c'c;t'ion is not a.1waY-~ appl ied 
when siting new plant~: Richardson recognizes that,II,naty.ral" focations 
-........ _. 
are not'always the most effi'cient and. that technical efficien~,ies,can 
make a variety of .iocatlons 'nearly identi.~al,iri average c.osts. This is, 
, . 
particularly true when 'certain' factor res.ources 'are immobile'so that. 
• ,.Y 
o~timum,efficiencies' are not att~ined. , , In thi"s case, ,there 'may be as": 
. ".-: 
, ~uch case ~or subsidizing movement of capi~al into a region as for 
. . " 
~, subsidizing mo~ement of lab'or :Out ~f i~.,'; The' test of efficiency"would 
" '-,' 
. , 
be to determine whether the marginal revenue p'rodu~t of the immobile, 
25Richardson: Ope cit' l p. 92. 
26Ibid 
,-
~ , - , 
" 
. l 
" . 
~;;"'-.. " 'J •. " 
. ~ -.~ 
, .,. ...... ~ • > 
",' .. ' ,;; 
" "''<, 
~-., . 
resource (labor) is greater than the marginal reve~ue product of the 
mobile resource (capital) in the alternative use from which it is di-
verted. Richardson introduces this concept of opportunity cost as a 
principal criterion for judging subsidy pol icies. 
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Richardson also suggests as a criterion that relocations of firms 
should be evaluated in terms of future income growth in both the export-
ing and receiving regions and in terms of demonstration effects and the 
generation of external economies rather than simply in terms of the 
number of jobs created and their cost. Applying these criteria will 
determine if, on net balance, a capital subsidy policy can be justified 
in economic terms. 
The question of efficiency in resource allocation does not neces-
sarily depend upon an assumption of optimality under free market con-
ditions, however. There is a presumption in subsidy programs that the 
subsidy will induce a firm to locate in an area where it otherwise 
would not go. Therefore, a reallocation would occur regardless of 
whether the freely chosen location would be an optimum. So the argument 
just proposed would affect the degree of efficiency alterations, but 
not necessarily the substance of the criticisms. 
Again, this question can be viewed from different perspectives. 
We have already seen that the resource allocation question produces 
different results when viewed at the national (general) level versus 
the local (specific) situation, and that in some cases it may even be 
possible to show that there is a conflict of interest at these two levels. 
Within the local area there are also some problems that need to 
be considered, in addition to those already mentioned. For example, 
some regional development programs seek as their objective the shift of 
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industry from urban to rural places that are characterized by an agri-
cultural economy. This is one of the stated objectives of the Oregon, 
proposals. Yet the location of industry in such an.area will have the 
two adverse effects of increasing wages and land costs for the farmer. 
One study of this situation27cited it as a serious problem for the small 
farmer. It noted that farmers often rely on seasonal and part-time 
workers who may become unavailable as full-time factory jobs are created. 
While the overall productivity of labor in the area may be increased, 
it is done so at the expense of an important sector of the rural economy. 
This question of altering resource allocations, then, is a complex 
one from the standpoint of state development policy. There are many 
externalities involved when shifts are made. This is true, however, 
whether those shifts are. induced by subsidies or occur without them. 
There are also external effects of leaVing a depressed area to dec! ine 
even fur.ther. It is reasonable to assume, however, that companies 
using subsidies will bave to be convinced that there are underemployed 
resources available which can be used productively. Where this is the 
case, the effect of the subsidy must be to increase the overall effi-
ciency of those resources, at least on the local level. It may be that 
those resources could be even more productive if moved to another area, 
but this also involves costs. Each situation, then, must be reviewed 
in detail to determine the optimum policy in terms of overall objectives. 
The preceding analysis has indicated that the types of subsidies 
employed in an industrial inducement program will have varying effects 
27 John T. Scott, Jr., IIEconomic Impact of Industrialization on 
Rural Areas," Illinois Business Review, Vol. 25, No, 8 (September, ·1968). 
pp. 6-8. 
upon the ine~sured results of theprogram._primarily because, of the 
different ways. they alter resource allocations. The efficiency· question 
~- ; 
in reallocating resources has also ~een examined. There are, howeve r, . 
two additional factors that will,have a major bearing on the results of' 
the program; the' economic c,h~racterjstic~ of the region, and the types 
of firms subsidized. These fac·tors-.wifl .'be analyzed 'in the last chapter 
, " 
when 'an examination 'is .made' into t"he poss'ible re~ults- that can be ex-
pected from a subsidy program in Oregon. Before this is done, though, 
\ 
some useful prel iminary information can be deve,loped by looking at 
• emp i rica 1 data on how subs i dy .p rograms, actua II yhave worked in other. 
. '. 
'areas: This will be the subject ~f ihe next chapter. 
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"CHAPTER IV" 
INFLUENCE OF INDUSTRIAL SUBSIDIES ON LOCATION DECISIONS 
The question of whet~er or not industriat incentlves can alter 
geographical patterns of economicactt--:ity wou1.d be moot if such'd~vises 
lacked influence upon the primary !nvestment,de'cision~'of.companies 
seeking new plant sites, The wide use' of incentives, supported by'an 
'extensive body of survey, and evaluations, suggests that a significant 
,degree of influence does exi~t. However; that influence varies by the 
" , 
" 
type of incentive use~ and,the prevalenc~of'other irite~ia' in ~h~ 
, investment decision. '~~aly~'is of these c6nsid~rations will b~ present~d :. 
1 -
.in this chapter. 
. , 
B'efore the empiri'cal evidence is given; however, it wil I be' useful:, 
to':'discuss'some theoret.ical concepts,pf industrial'.location ana how sub-' 
~idies function to,alter::the' loCation d~disi~n ~{a firm'.-' -This"wiil,:,<o._,: 
help to put such incentives into persp~c.tive with other 'location criteria. 
" An analysis of'optimal loc~tio~ the~~y 
,:' . 28,,' ' , 
sidles is given by Richardson. ' In ~eneral 
and the'Jnfluerice of sub- c,'" 
tei"ms~the 'opt itria~ 'geo- """':' 
graphic location, for a fj'rm wi.11 be·where'the combined factor inputs'. ,,', 
;.in the production an'd marketing proces,ses will produce the l,owest costs 
, per ,unit of produ~t sold in the market; Since it would be improbable 
that the lowest costs for all factors woul,d be found in a single location, 
the search. for the opt,i:maJ location nece~sarily ,~equires weigh,inghigher 
'. , 
,; * \ -1_-
_ '. T 
~ . 
. '; .. 
. , 
, " 
. -~.~ ~ -.~ '. 
• r ' 
........ .; 
,', 
costs for some factors versus lower costs for others at a variety of 
\ possible locations. An area with ·low labor 'costs, f~r, example, might, 
. " ' -
have high transp~rtation cost~ for"del ive'red raw.materials or finished 
goods shippe~, to market; or low raw material 'costs may be associated 
wi th high· costs for 1 and and cap i taL, 
For ,each of ,the poss ib Ie lo<?at iOr:!s 'surveyeQ, ,these factor costs 
will 'combi,ri,~ to produce an averagEjl cost p'er uni} 'of projected output. 
" , ~ , ';/ •• ~ , > ~ 
W~en all of these individual average costs ar~ charted" the result, is 
an average cost cur~e wh i ch covers the en,t i re tang'e, ,of a1'ternat ive 
. / 
locations. The low point on this IJ-shaped cur,ve will identify the 
optimai location'}n terms of lowest',average ,cost. 
To a,.firm in a competitive industry;, where the price per unit 'of 
',' 
~.. ,1 
product sold is fixed bY'the market~ the ~loca{ion offering the lowest' 
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average cost wi II also offer maxi,mu"m 'prof'its(assumfng average ,revenues. 
, . 
are greater than average' c~sts). $0 the average cost determination 
estabJ ishes, the 10c,ation for a firm'mot,ivated ~y profit,maximization .. 
While computer analysi's makes s~ch determinati6n possible, the 
, > ,.. • 
! ~ ~) 
result isa static model ~ather than one ~hich predicts average costs. 
. ' 
o~~r~ the, I i~e of the plant.' ,As previously noted~lo'ng-term e.fficiency 
'~onsiderations will modifyfhe lowes~-aye'r,age-cost d~t~'~mination"to someo" 
'degree. This qualificatioM. then, ~ill"t~nd to'Teduce th~ probability 
. ". " . ~ . 
" ~h~t the: firm will find onlY'o~e site which will satisfy its locationai' 
, , ' 
'requirements. Theore,tical1y,. any site within t'he range'of profitabil ityT, 
. whe re ave rage' cos t s 'a re lowe r t han a~er'age revenues 'may be . cons i dered by 
the firm which is seeki,ngprofit maximizatio~. Excluded from considera..; 
. 
tion, however, will be those 10cati9ns outside the range, where profits 
would be made. I 
I • 
, . , , 
+ . 
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In this framework, it can be seen,how incentives wo'rk to influence 
'1- . ~ 
the, I ocat iona I decision of' the f trm.R:ichar,dson'i SJ diagram, 29 modified 
,. },' 
sl ightly and reprodl;lced here a,S .Fi,9;G.re r, shows the U-shap'edaverage 
cast curve for the rarygeof possibrelocations"measured ·spatially,· 
alo,:!9 with the horizontal average revenue cur-ve·which is fixed by the 
market for ~ll locations. The leasi cost location is ident1fied as Z, 
while Mx and My represent the spatial .limits, to profitabil ity. 
, ' 
FIGURE, . 3 
'EFFECT OF 'SUBSIDIES' ON LOCATION DECISIONS 
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The effect pf the ~ubs i dy, whether' it- is offered as a tax reduc- '. 
tion, a capital ~ost advanta.ge 'or some. other form o~ direct cos~ subsidy, 
" . 
.' . , . . 
is to reduce average ~osts, thus'b~oadenin9 the spatial range of profit-
·able locations .. By applyin'g the subsidy discriminately to areas which 
" .''''' 
would not.normally be ab'l~ to a't"tra~t,. industry,- it becomes possible to 
extend the. boundaries of, the. margin of pr:ofitability to inclUde thos~ 
29 " 
. Ib I d. " p. 66. 
;~- . 
, . - . ~ 
.. 
'. 
45 
areas. 
The example shown 'on the diagram assumes· a graduated subsidy 
~rogram,"with no:subsidi~s offered at the optimum location and inc~eased 
incentive~ becoming avarl~ble as the fir~' departs farther from'that 
optimum .. In this case, .rather "than the a.verage cost, curve being shifted 
downward to widen its spatial limits.of profitable operations, the 
_~ntire shape of the curve is ~ltered. The spatial I im~ts 0' profit~' 
abil ity are widened, but the average costs at the optimum location 
remain the same. The new I imits to profitabil ity now become Mx' and' 
This simpli~ied model tan be directly ap~l ied to the three types 
of sUbsidies analyzed in the las~ chapter. The~e,it was assumed that 
average costs remained ~onstant but tha't pricesdecl.ined. 'This would ',.' 
haye the effect of lowering. the average revenue I ine and narrowing the 
spatial range of profitable operations. 
By providing a wage or capital subs.idy, the 'average cost curve \ 
for the firm"would be shifted downward to return to the original spatial 
relationship,onlyat lower 'cost and price levels. The d·i fference ' 
between actual average' costs afld the average costs for the .firm would 
be the ~irect cost of ~he sub~idy: 
In the case 0: a pr'ice. sub,s!dy, average costs would remain the 
same but the re~enue. line wou,ld /;leo shifted upward aga.in to its original 
level, with the difference between ,t.he ma'rket price and the fevenue. 
received by the firm being the direct cost of the su~sidy. 
The most c6mmon form of sub~idies, and those which will be s~e-
cifically analyzed in this chapter, are financial incentives and tax 
reductions. Both'of these act to lower the ave~age costs for the firm 
. .' 
.' 
.. , , ~ . 
and would therefore a~fect the location decisio~ i~ a way similar to 
that outlined above for wage an~ capital subsidies. 
Richardson also includes an example of how'the reverse of 'subsi-
'dies, disincentives, can be used to deflect new firms away from areas 
where new'growth may be undesi,rable. This cbuld be done ,through the 
impositionof a ~peeiai 't~x which would rcii~e 'averag'e costs in thos'e 
areas to,a,level above the average revenue line: Fi'rmswould then'have 
to locate outside that area' 'in order to make ~ profit'. One obvious 
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problem with this alternative is that the~ range of , profitable operations 
. . 
for a firm might easily extend across s~ate or regi.onal 'boundaries and 
such di~incentives, employed within the confi~es of a si~g~e state, 'mi~ht 
easily have th~ ~effect of deflecting ,fir~s to profitable locations in ' 
other states rather than to depressed area~ wJth.n'the state imposing 
, 
the disincentives: Since,we are ~ookihg 'at policy alternativ~s at the' 
single state.level, that type of program'does ,oot'appear to offer 
, , 
practical consideration. 
Th is' ana I ys i s shows 'some 'of' ~he theoret i ca 1 imp 1 i cat ions of s,ub-
sidy pol iei'es on, plant l?cation, decisions.' We can, now look, at.empirical 
" evidence to' assess the' effectiv'eness ,of ~uch pol icies where ~hey have 
, f • ~. "' • 
been app lied in, reg i ona I, deve I opment progr,ams. Spec i f i,ca II y" we will 
. .. 
'look at thE;l,most cC?mmon forms of industri,al .subsidie~; financial incen-
. , 
tives and'tax, in~ucements~ 
, , 
FINANCIAL 'INCENTIVES' 
.1 ,. 
On the basis of p~blished suiveys, a-direct corelation cao be : 
established fairly ~asiJY b~tween·financial iflcentives to industry and 
('" ... 
~ew plant locations. Such ihc~ntives can take ~arious forms, incJuding 
the financing, of pla-nt and equipm~nt with tax-exempt bonds, or direct", 
cash grants:, In any cas,e, the effect is to .lower c~pital costs for the 
" 
, firm locating in a' designate~ area. ' 
" Program~ i n-, ~anada ~r:'ese,nt 'some of the best-documented case hi s-
tories of-the effects of'financial lncentives. Operating under th~ 
RegionaL Development In'centivesAct, defined as: 1,~An Act to provide 
incentives for ,the' deve"lopment of-productive employment opportunities' 
in regions of Canada determined to require 'special measures to facili-
tate economic expansion' and social 
" - 30 
adjustment,ll : the Canadian Depart-
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ment of Regional E~onomic Expansron' has.a~thoriz~d or und~rtaken numer-
ous studies to measure th~ ~ffeitiveness ~f industrial incentive prog~a~s 
in that country. ,:creat~d by an Act "of Pair 1 iament, the Regional Develop-
ment Incent,ives Act became-effective 'July. I, 1969, to create new job 
opportunities in regions of ,high unemployment or slow' economlc·gr~wth., 
It replaced. earl ier programs of a similar ~ature under the Area Develop~ 
,t • , 
ment Act. Administered, through the proyi,n,cial governments, the .pl,an 
offers no 'tax reduct)ons b!Jf. 'i,'nstead prov:id~s generous 'capital incentJves 
'. ~. . 
" to industry for manufacturer's -estab'fish,ing, expanding or ~odernizing 
plants in ·the designate,d regions._ Up to $12 million'per plant is 
, " 
available in cash grants based on capital i~vestment in the operation, 
the number:<?f j6b~ created and the'specific location. All m~mufa-cturing.- . 
and most ~inds.of processi~g~firm~ a~e ,e) igible,excluding those e~gaged 
'in lniti~l processin~ in a resource-based industry, such as oil refining, 
30 ' 
Re ional Develo Act 1968-1969 c. 56 (Ottawa: 
Queenls Printer For 
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d . 31 P'u.l p an newsp r, nt. ,'. 
One of the most thorough studies authorize'd I.lnder this program 
comes from the south~rn Georgi~ Bay region in dnt~rio, where 'an A.~.A .. 
• t, 
incentives plan was car~fully scrutinized during its fi~st two year~ 
of ,operation. 32 Frpm the commencement of the incentives program in 
, . 
August, 1965, until the time of 'a questionnaire survey in August~ 1967, 
thirty-one plants in the re'gi'on reported that they h~d made u~e of the' 
program. Of these, eighteen were entirely new ~o the area and cited 
" 
the :,incEmtives.program,as their primary r~ason for ,locating there'., .The, 
study showed,that a little over $7 mill ion had been granted to these 
firms by the end of 1968. 
, 
Direct and indirect investment generated by this program came td,' 
'more than $80 mi II ion, w!th '~h~' new :actorfes account ing for $77 ~i II io;n 
of this', 'It is estimated that employment, grew in the area by 27.3 
perce,nt,because of t'his,new investment, Which was an increase o'f over 
5,000 jobs.' ?ayrolls )ncreased in e~cess of $20,mi'll ion and lo~al tax 
revenues grew by about $1 mill ion. To cite the study: 
In more 'general terms, it (the program) effectively revolu-:-
" 'tionized almost every aspect of t~e economic I ife of the 
,southern Georgia Bay Region,' raising it from: a lightly indus-
trialJzed, primary producing area ~ith little hope'for growth, 
to a,potentially fast developing lndustrial region geared to 
the booming Ontario econo~y.33? ' 
.f , 
Thi s endorsement was tempered,however, by some' other facts 
brought out in the ~tudy. 'One was 'that the are~ was begining to 
! ' 
31 .' Ib Id, ,. ' 
32M' .. d d f d 'I ' 
.H. Yeates an P.E: Lloy ,'1m act 0 In ustrla Incentives: 
Southern Georgian Bay Region, Ontario Ottawa: Pol icy Planning Branch, 
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1968). 
" , 
33 . '.; Ib , d ., p. 25 ~ 
, .' 
. ' 
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experience the spread effects of growth in the Toronto area and the 
incentives program served as a stimulus to accelerate that spread, 
which seems to contradict the prior statement that the area had Iq ittle· 
hope for growth. 1I It was also noted that a recently-completed new 
highway, connecting the area with Toronto, attracted the majority of 
the new plants. This provided a benefit of reducing transport costs 
and providing easier access to a major market and freight interchange. 
Presumably, the program would have been less successful without this 
additional asset. In concluding its evaluation, the study states that: 
II • the designated area was something of a special case and by no 
means the epitome of a depressed region. This must be clearly borne in 
f . 34 mind in gauging the reasons or the success of the program. 11 
Studies of successful programs in other areas of Canada generally 
make the same kinds of qual ifications. A Nova Scotia survey 35included 
80 companies which had built new facilities in the 1963-1967 period, 
45 of which had received financial incentives from the provincial 
assistance program. The total capital investment of the assisted firms 
was $194 million, versus $22 million for the 35 non-assisted firms. The 
survey showed that the assisted plants created direct employment of 1554 
people, plus an additional 1682 jobs through backward and forward link-
ages, and 2005 more through multiplier effects, for a total of 5242 jobs. 
Of the 45 companies receiving assistance, 19 said that the influence 
of the incentives program had been sufficient to affect their location 
34 b'd 65 I I ., p. 
35R~bert L. Comeau, A Stud of the 1m act of the Area Develo ment 
Agency Program in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 19 9 
choice. A larger number, however, felt th'aLthe program had' exercised, 
some influence on their, development plans, either'sp~eding up the:_ 
, plan~ed development or encouraging t~e firm to"enlarge fts plans . 
. When viewed in context with other investment criteria, however, : 
50 
this study also concluded~that the inducements affected only the marginal 
~ ~ -; 
choices and that theTe were other prime factors in'the location decisions:' 
, , 
It states:"AII in all,'the"'natural' conditions: raw material, markets, 
'I abour and transportat ion ap'p.ear to be the most, importa':1t fact'~'rs 'deter'" 
mining choice of 10~atlons.~;36 . 
.. . 37 A third Cana'dian study also' confirnis this conclUSion. After 
, : .. "'-
reviewing the succe~s of the regional incentives program in attracting 
<" 
new investment to northwestern Qntar lo!' ,the study states that: 
The e'stabl ishment of , new, 'or the' expansion of existing indus~' 
try, depends upon two preconditions: (I) an ,initial demand for 
,a resource fr0m the region to start the development process, a 
demand emanating, 'usually, from ou~side the region; and (2) a 
population 'watershed' large enough to sustain the growth process 
once started. ' ., . 
These ~x~mples from Canada would indicate that financial incen-
tives can influence companies to locate in less developed regions but 
only if certain other factors are-avaUable which can contribute to 
y .~ • • 
efficient operation. This conclus'ion,is also 'made in many .studies of 
~imilar programs at the federal and state levels in the United States. 
One Ameri can report re I eased in' 1970. f~ r examp I e, eva I uated' the, 
- """ ,.:" - ~. - - " -
influence of,42 program~ of, federal ~ssl~tance to reallocate the'geo-
". i 
.: 
3~Ib i d.', 'p. 136. ~ 
37The Northwe~t Ontario ·Regi'onal Deveiopment Program (Ottaw~: 
Department of Treasury and Economics, Regional Development Branch, 1969) . 
. 
~ ~ " 
, -~ . 
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. - "t 
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graphical distribution of industrial activity.38 These programs encom-
passed a wide range of activities, including business loans, grants for 
the development of infrastructure, and manpower programs. Among the 
conclusions of this report was that: 
The fundamental requirements of the American economic system; 
natural resources, labor, capital and markets, are influenced 
to some extent by more than forty federal programs which provide 
assistance to publ ic agencies, private institutions and individ-
uals. But the geographic impacts of these programs, in the 
aggregate, are modest: They are largely confined to accelerating 
pre-existing trends toward economic concentration in metropol itan 
areas or
39o curbing sl ightly prevail i~g trends of economic decl ine. 
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Several reasons were given for this 1 imited influence, particularly 
that: "Broad economic forces and locational decisions of the private 
sector are the major determinants of geographic distribution (regional-
1 oca I) of econom i c development and growth .11 
In analyzing individual programs, however, the study found that: 
"Aid to business investments--including loan guarantees, subsidized 
loans, subsidized plant and equipment--has the greatest and most immed-
40 iate effect of stimulating additional economic development. 1I 
It should be noted that part of the I imited influence of federal 
programs was ascribed to administrative difficulties. The report also 
charged that many programs were conducted without a clearly defined 
objective. 
Another report which looked at dispersion of industry as a national 
pol icy was conducted by the Fantus Company. In its overall assessment, 
38Federal Activities Affecting Location of Economic Development, 
prepared for the U.S. Department of Commerce by the Center for Pol itical 
Research, 1970. 
39 Ib i d., p. 1-1. 
40 Ibid . 
the report stated: 
Basically, it has to be remembered that the business execu-
tive entrusted with plant location decisions will continue to 
seek a site which so combines all locational factors as to 
give the lowest cost per unit of output ..... And in many 
instances, he will be interested in incentive industrial 
financing programs provided that these do not make him sacri-
fice or compromise his locational objectives. 41 
52 
On the national level, then, the influence of financial incentives 
on business investment decisions would appear to be positive only where 
other required conditions exist. 
Perhaps of greater interest .for state pol icyconsiderations_, how-
ever, will be a review of other state programs in the United States. 
Moving from national pol icy to state programs, though, involves a 
change in emphasis. Where national efforts are primarily aimed at 
encouraging business investment in areas of high unemployment, most 
state programs, in the past, have been operated with less regard to 
geographic distribution to areas of need within the state. State 
programs for financial assistance primarily increase available credit 
or lower costs through subsidized interest rates to firms locating any-
where within the state. Such programs, then, create a high degree of 
competition between states with limited regard for altering development 
patte~ns or dispersing growth to non-metropol itan areas. 
In fact, the rnultipl icity of location factors discussed above has 
largely resulted in state financial Incentive programs being used to 
further concentrate economic activities. The competitive nature of such 
programs has encouraged state agencies to apply their incentives in 
41 Fantus Company, How Much Can We Influence The Growth of Industr 
in Rural Areas, prepared for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
1970), pp. 36-37. 
locations which can offer th~_variety of location requisites which form 
the ,principal basis'for investment decisions. 
The Fantus report: previously cited,_ mentionst,he' example of 
Kentucky which found that !t could me,asurably increase j,ts overall 
state growth rate by' obtaining"a larger share of national indusfrial 
. '"" r, 
. . .. 
growth. The state accompl ished thrs"by:' II • . concehtratihg'on those 
location opportunities for ~hich the greatest advantage to industry 
, 
-~'. "42 
could be demonstrated." 
.r 
t 
---' When state financial incentives are used' 'in this manner, it is 
(~ 
• --"'" ~ > • ... 
relatively easy to correlate the incenti~es with new plant investm~rt, 
by the use of empirical evid~nce. ,It~,is 'more difficult; howev~r, to 
draw conclusions .from that correlation as to the strength of the" incen-
'-< ., .... ,. , 
tives program' in the final location decisIon ~hen weighed ag~inst other 
... .... " 
.factor.s",:A firm, for exampl,e, may'consjder a n~w p'lant locati.on' in any 
. , 
one of several ,states offering industriaL revenue bonds.' While the 
'final decision may be made on the basis' of some-other ~riterion, the 
, ' 
'availabil ity of revenue bonds to build the plant would be cited as a 
,causal fact'or reg<:"lrdl'e~s' of which state 'nnaliy:~rec~ived the investment.' 
Whi leit is easy to ,overstate' the" importance of" fi~ancial incen:-, 
tives as a causal iactor in )hvestmeni decisions, ~he~e rs evidence that 
their exis'tence does contribute to'the lo'cation of industry between 
'-1 
states. Part of the reason for thls 1 ies in the nature of the companies 
that use such i ncent ives and the e~pectat:ionsof those 'f i rms . 'A study 
of industrial bond financing in Alabam'a reveaied'that whereas 65 per~ent 
of the fi!m~ using this' form 6f as~i~tance"in'Alabama had considered, 
42 . ' Ibid." p. 33.' 
.' 
;-'.' ~ 
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alternative locations in other states, only 47 percent of the firms 
. . 1 f" . d'd 43 Th' . I" h . t d uSing conventlona Inanclng I so. IS Imp les t at assls e 
companies investigated a larger riumber of plant locations and may have 
been seeking the "best deal." 
In doing so; however, the industrial bonds were considered very 
important. Of the 54 firms in the survey ·that had used them, 38 ranked 
this factor no lower than third in order of importance among all loca~ 
tion factors, making it the most frequently mentioned of all factors. 
In analyzing this finding, the study states: 
Consid~ring that about one-sixth of all new plants and plant 
expansions in Alabama have been financed with industrial bonds, 
it would appear that such bonds are a decisive marginal factor 
for as many as 10 percent of the firms locating plant facil ities 
in Al~bama. This is a' relatively small proportion of the total 
number of firms, but from the standpoint of capital investment44 and employment, their influence is scarcely 'inconsequential '. 
The study reinforces this last statement by reveal ing that the 38 
. 
firms which gave a high ranking to industrial bonds had invested about 
$318,052,000 in manufacturing facil ities and had an associated employ-
ment of 7,293 persons. This translates into an average investment of 
$43,500 in plant facil ities per job created--an investment figure sub-
stantially above the United States average at that time (1963) of 
$21,500. 
This finding, if generally supported in other areas, would indicate 
that financial inc~ntives are most important to firms in capital inten-
sive industries. This would Seem logical since for these firms 
43A. A. Thompson, "Business Experience With Industrial Aid Bonds 
as a Source of External Financing: Some Empirical Evidence." Cal ifornia 
Management Review (Winter, 1970), p. 30. 
44Ibid ., p. 31. 
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the differential costs of financing plant and equipment at varying 
interest rate levels would be significantly more important than for a 
company with relatively low capital requirements. A brief exercise 
will show how a firm can real ize substantial cost reductions through 
lho lowor Intorost ratos available from tax-exempt bond financing. 
TABLE XI 
INTEREST COST COMPARISON OF A TAX-EXEMPT AND TAXABLE CORPORATE 
FINANCING FOR A REPRESENTATIVE ISSUE OF 
$1,000,000 OF TWENTY-YEAR BONDS. 
Interest at Interest at Fully 
Bonds Principal Tax Exempt Taxed Corporate 
Year Outstanding Amortization Rate of 5i% Rate of 7i% 
1 $1,000,000 $ 0 $ 55,000 .$ 75,000 
2 1,000,000 0 55,000 75,000 
3 1,000,000 0 55,000 75,000 
4 1,000,000 0 55,000 75,000 
5 1,000,000 62,500 55,000 75,000 
6 937,500 62,500 51,563 70,313 
7 875,000 62,500 48,125 65,625 
8 812,500 62,500 44,688 60,938 
9 750,000 62,500 41,250 56,250 
10 687,500 62,500 37,813 51,563 
II 625,000 62,500 34,375 46,875 
12 562,500 62,500 30,938 42,188 
13 500,000 62,500 27,500 37,500 
14 437,500 62,500 24,063 32,813 
15 375,000 62,500 20,625 28,125 
16 312,500 62,500 17,188 23,438 
17 250,000 62,500 13,750 18,750 
18 187,500 62,500 10,313 14,063 
19 125,000 62,500 6,875 9,375 
20 62,500 62,500 3z438 4 z688 
Total interest costs: $687,504 $937,504 
Table XI shows the "Interest Cost Comparison of Tax-Exempt and 
Taxable Corporate Financing for a Representative Issue of $1,000,000 
of Twenty-Year Bonds. 1I During the first four years of the financing 
there is no principal payment. The mill ion dollars are then repaid in 
~ . : 56 
sixteen equal, payments'"with the first payment star,ting'at the end of" 
the fifth ~ear. A representativ~'tax exempt 'rate such as .might apply 
to industri~l revenue bonds for a better credit rating is given here as 
st percent. At this rate, a.corporation reimbursing:a p,ublic-'agency for 
< actual financial 'costs will, :'pay a totali,nte,rest 'cost of $68],504 over' 
the) ife of the loan. A represe~t~tive taxable tate f6~ 'the sam~ cor-{, 
,. , 
porat ion borrowi ngi n the private marke't is given as 7t percent (prime 
interest 'rates have 'i ncr~ased s i nee these ca I cu 1 at ions were made)" 
, . -
making the interes~ cost tot~l $937,504 over the 1 ife of the loan. 
. ,.. \;! , 
• '4:" 
Financing a project, by full~~taxed corporate b~ndi, instead, of util izing 
industrial' revenue bonds, wH 1 ;'es~lt, in' :$250,000 more expense,wh.iCh is 
36.'4% higher than w'ith':'the ,o'ther !!lethod. ,Ob'vt'ously,for a capital 
intensive firm this 'can mean a significant cos~ difference. 
In spite of thts'p6ssible importance of~yinancial incentives, the 
Alabama study previously ~i'ted also stressed the need for other basic 
requirements. ~It concluded by saying ,that: 
, -Nevertheless~ the response 'pattern~ indicates that collateral 
influences such as market access, available labor, and suit-
able plant sites must be present in sufficient degree. In 
other words, unless alternative plant sites are rea'sonably . 
comparable in terms of conventional location factors,. the cost-
saving features of industrial bond financing wi,ll be insuffi-
cient to cause a shift away, from a site where industrial' bond, 
financing may not be available. 45 
Th~ example of Alabama ,is supported by' surveys !~ other ~eogra- ' 
phical regions., ,One such "surveyreview6c:J state financial incen'tive. 
programs in fifteen ~tates,:prima~ily in the New England' region. Over-
. ~ ! 
' .... -. 
, 
all, state loan programs evoked a highly .favorable reSponse with 59 ~- -- -
'.'1.. 
", 
,. ' 
" 
" 
," 
" 
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percent of respondents saying that this had influenced their locafibn 
-. ",~ . -. 
Subsidized interest rate prog~ams-1~ .Penrisylvania a~d New 
--"'";"'~ -,. .. 
decision. 
York produced quest ionnci'i re respon~es.of 77 percent ~nd ?2 percent; 
respectively, claiming such subsidies had iverymuchl or Imuch l influ-
'46 
ence on their Investment decisions. Here again"lt ~~~ stated"that the 
',firms had ~lso satisfied themselve~ as to ~he a~ail~bil ity of other 
necessary factors. 
On the basis,of publ ished surveys,and studies, then, financial· 
incentives pf various types would;appe~r to offer.promise as a tool 
f 
·for' attracti~g indust~ies' to states where they may not otherwise 
locate. In seeking optimal ity in the location de,cision, ~owever" th'e 
)nvestor will ~till require that other economi~ conditions be'satisfied. 
~, ~. 
Sa state financial inducements must be r~garded as ~ marginal influente 
rather than constituting a p~~mary factci~. ~Nonetheless; that margin~l 
. . 
influence is positive for a sta.te desiring to'a~t~act new industry, and'" ~ 
attracting indust~y to·the st~fe! ~~ encouraii~g expansi~n within,the 
... ~ .', 
state, is a riecessary requisite to influencin~ its location within the 
state. 
TAX INCENTIVES, 
, ' 
~ax concessions cif,various ,kinds are another ~idely-used form of 
industrial l~cation i~centi~e~_' The prop~rty t~i' is most commonly ~sed 
for the incentive; although other taxes might also be:used. The effect 
of a tax reduction or compl~te removal is similar to that of a wage or 
~ ~ 
capital subsidy in that ,it lowers the average costs for the',firm., As in, 
'/ 
46G• W. Sazama, IIState Industrial Development Loans: A General 
Analysis," Land Economics 46:171-80. (May,l 197~). 
~;_ ... i 
• I , 
'" 
, -,' 
the case of subsidize~ 'capital expenditu~es,' there'have been many sur~ 
';I~ys and 'studies which have at~empted to defermine the'effect of taxes 
in ~nfluencing .industrial ftrms to locate in an area where' they might 
otherwise not' go. 'Their conclusions produce mixed resufts. 
, , , 
The i~portance of tax ,rates1 wh~n viewed as differenti~ls betwee~ 
local ities'"is generally minimized: as ,a location factor. The principal 
;- " 
reason f~r this i~ that the 'differential costs of other factors such as 
, ' 
; 
labor and transportation are usually greater between,different areas 
. ' , \ ,-
than are the differential costs of taxes.' Whil,e'the total costs of the 
taxes must be considere~ a~ an important,part.of the costs of doing, 
, ," ',,- \ ", 
business, only the differentials are important in comparing the ~eiative 
co~ts ,of taxes in various locations:' , ; , 
, 4 
A 1~60 study 7showed taxes"ranked thirteenth on a list of,location 
factors in a survey of 272 firms which had built pla,nts i,n Kentucky, 
Tennessee and ~ississippi~ Only 32 f1r~~ out of th~ 272:indicated.that 
'. , , 
the tax ,structure' influenced their choice of ,!ocat,ion and only seven of 
these listed'it as of" primary impo'rtance~ 
,48 
A ~olorado study produced similar results; The ~indings were 
based on ,253 usab1.e returns 'fro~ m~mufact,uring firms which were ques-
'". 
tioned as to their reaso'ns for locating'in ~olorado. 'Taxes ,ran:ked 
; twenty-seventh out,of the thirfy item~listed with only 12.7 ~ercent of 
.' : 
,the firms ind,icati,ng, any consideration had b'een',g,iven to"Colorado's 
ment 
: < 
47Jhomas Bergin,-,IIAre Subs:idies Worthwhile?1I Industrii31 Develop-
(July, 1960), -pp. 77-78. 
48", " , . 
W.E. Morgan; liThe Effects of State and Local Tax and Financial 
Inducements on Industrial Location" (unpubl ished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Un iver~ ity of Co lorado, 1964). 
, {, 
'-,-:-
, i ~ , 
/ 
.. 
, ' 
state and local taxes in making their location decisions. This posi-
tion is summarized by the statement that: 
If all other factors could be assumed equal, it follows 
that differences in taxes would influence locational ~e-
CIS Ions. But other factors push in various ways and are 
often bigger than tax costs. In most studies based on the 
interview technique, industrial ists tend to agree4that taxes are a secondary consideration in location choice. 9 
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The conclusions reached by these studies can be more easily under-
stood by reviewing appl icable statistical data. For example, it is 
possible to obtain data which show that taxes are a relatively small 
percentage of total business costs. Helen A. Cameron, in her article 
IIProperty Taxation as a Location Factor," used figures from the 1963 
Corporate Income Tax Returns to show tax costs as a percentage of costs 
and operation for selected industries and dollar assets. 50 Using her 
format, but changing the data to show statistical calculations from the 
1969 corporate tax returns, the following table is obtained: 
TABLE XII 
TAX COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF COSTS AND OPERATION FOR SELECTED 
INDUSTRIES AND DOLLAR ASSETS - (ASSETS IN $1,OOOls) 
TO 500 TO 5,000 TO 50,000 TO 250,000 
INDUSTRIES 50 1 ,000 10,000 100,000 UP 
Printing & Publ ishing 4.2 4.3 3.7 3.9 3.6 
Leather & Leather Prod. 4.4 2.9 3.2 3.4 2.7 
Primary Metals 3.0 3.7 3.1 2.7 4.0 
Fabricated Metals 4.7 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.6 
Machinery (except elec.) 5.0 3.6 3.9 3.8 5.1 
Electrical Equipment 3.9 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.8 
Trans. Equip. (except auto) 2.8 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.1 
Motor Vehicles 5.4 2.9 3.2 4.3, 5.5 
49 
Richard W. Poole, "An Approach for Evaluating the Impact of 
State-Local Taxes on Industrial Location 'l New Mexico Business Vol. 23, 
(June, 1970), p. 8. 
'50 Helen A. Cameron, "Property Taxation as a Location Factor," 
Bulletin of Business Research, Ohio State University, (April,1969), p.l. 
t' ." 
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Data from federal .corporation inco~e tax returns show ali deduc-
'tible 't~~es iM on~ ~igure ,and ihis was used to determine the percentage 
~. . 
of total operating costs. How8v'er,;' that tax figllre includes .'Iordinary 
" , 
, . -
state and local taxes paid or accru,ed ~uring t'he year; social security 
':'and payrolltaxesj unemployment insur.ance taxes; " and bus·iness '1 icense 
. ~ . 
and privilege taxes~I,1 Becau'se of 'this :wide v'ariety of taxes i'ricluded, 
the calculations overstate the significance of property taxes as a 
bus i nesS expense. ',' ;-' 
"Looking at -property tax differentials, then, we are considering 
a ~~rcentage of a relatively small business cost item. An examination 
of the differential property,tax rat.es inOregOri will give some indi-
cation of how wide the variations are in this,'state. 
Table XIII shows that the sp'read between the highest ar:td lowes't 
, property' ta,x rates in Oregem in 1969-.1970 amounted to $18,,83 per .$1,000 
of true cash value. That spread, however, occurred between two counties 
... ; ~ 
,which both' ,ranked poorly in the' indicators of e'conomic .health:',the 
highest, Hood River County, .r.anked28, and the ,lowest, Wallowa County, 
.' ranked 33 out of the 36 .counties. The'mar-gin'bet~eel1 the',rapidly~ " .~. 
growing Willamette Valley counties and' the poorer, areas 'of central and" 
" 
eastern Oregon was less' than the marg'in between the two extremes. 
The 'comparison of rank in, tax rates with· ~ank ,ih economic health 
~, , 
indicators was made because' of another c~nsideration important to'pol icy 
,-" ., . ' " 1.,'" '... 
" 
dec i s i on~ .. ' That i ~~, how, .much 'can a -1 oca r areaaffo'rd- to fore'go : 'in ,Ja.x: 
revenues in order to provide 'tax incentives to }ndustry.· :This will :be 
consider~d in more detail in'the next chapter when fiscal costs are 
reviewed, but it, can be _pointed out .he.re 'that there is of~en .an· inverse 
relationship be'tween'tc!x rates andLthe'need for econ9mic;improvements:', 
. "",-
", . 
1 ',.., ' ... : 
--t: ~-'-
:::. ~, ..... " < ~~ .. 
. ~ S' 
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TABLE XIII , ", 
, , 51, ' 
AVERAGE PROPERTY TAX RATES IN OREGON ,COUNTIES; 1969-1970 • 
COUNTY 
Baker 
Benton 
Clackamas' 
Clatsop 
Columbia 
Coos 
Crook 
Curry 
Deschutes" 
Douglas 
Gi 11 iam 
Grant 
Harney 
Hood RiVer 
Jackson , 
Jefferson , 
Joseph i ne 0 
Klamath~ 
Lake' , 
Lane 
Li ncol n 
Linn 
Malheur 
Mar ion' 
, AVERAGE TAX RATES' 
, IN DOLLARS PER ' 
$ I ,000 T. C • V • : ' 
14.86 
26.31 
26.59 
22.53 
22.10 
25.36 
18.86 
19:72 
26.45 
17.49 
'16:51 
. 21.40, 
, ,24.01 
30.14' 
~ 22.83 
l7:47 
'" -, 19.33" 
" 
, 17.02 
15.09 
, 27.90, 
"17.11 ; 
,21.09 
20.03 ' 
24.22 
.,'" . 
Morrow '..' 18.87" 
Multnomah" " ';" '29.31, 
Polk "" , ,24.51 
Sherman , 
Til l'amook ' I 
, Umat i II a 
, 15.53 
18'.15 
25.50 
RANK IN 
TAX RATES, 
", 35 
7 
5, 
IS,; 
16 ' 
- 9 
25 
22, 
6' 
28 ' 
. 31 
18, 
13· 
; . 'I 
, .14 
" ; 29 
"23 
30" -- ; 
: 34 " 
3 
, 27 
,19 . 
, 21 
, 12 
, ,24' 
" ,2: ' 
',' .r ,,' ~ 1 'I . - -, 
'l 32 
":", ;"26 ,: 
" .-, ,,1 8 
20 . 
" 
, , 
RANK IN COMPOSITE 
OF ECONOMIC HEALTH 
INDICATORS, 
25 
10 
, 2, 
15 
"-,.. 5 
20 
16 
',31 
,4 
23 
,'26 
23 
7 
28 
12 '. _ 
-, .'. 
29 ,', '::' 
, , 32 
, 16 
34 
11 
" 
~ • .- ..... ,-.: t 
30 
9 
27 
...... ',::'.' 
;.' . ~' 
'8 . -' , 
" 
19' 
.. 6 "; 
, "13 
, " : ',',. 36; "",', 
21"" ' .' 
18 
'3 , Union ... ,,', 
Wallowa ,{ 
Wasco ~ "~ ~~. 
, 20.83 
11.,31. 
21.99 
27.01 
15.43 
24.97 
i 36 .~ ~_ . 33 ' . '" . ':,. 
r' ~ '<, 
Washington 
Whee ler ',:' . 
Yamh ill, ; , 
" 
State Avera'ge 
',' 
,: 24.81 
'. : 17 ' J. _" 
,~ ~ .~ 4 
, 33, 
, ,: 10, 
22 .... , 
'I "--, 
. ::". :f~:', : ' 
_. ..' .' -
510regon Division ~f Economic Development, District Fa~ts' {Salem: 
Oregon, Printing Office. l,972~. " ' , 
,. 
" , '1 ' 
, < 
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,Many of the counties that show the poorest levers of economic health ',' 
also have among the lowest prope~ty'tax rates in the 'state. ,In add,i~lon 
,to the policy implications'th'is 'involve~., it als~ recontirms that low,,' 
·tax rates"are not necessarily'an inducement to,industrial location since 
Industry ~as,establ ish~d apatt~rn,of,locating in areas where ~ax rates 
are relatively higher.' 
Assigning tax considerations to a 'secondary role, however, is not 
sufficient to discredit the potential usefulness of tai credits in 
.I. • '. 
tegional, devel6pment programs: With ~he ~ccept~nce that taxes play only 
'a m~rginat role in'bu~iness investment decisi?ns, the~e ~re still some 
facets of th,at role that have impHc~tions"for policy arid planning by 
state development agencies.' 
"-
One of these 'relates to the "taxclimate,",or the structure of 
taxation. One of the 'more thorough studi~s oi the effe~ts~f tax~tion 
on industri~l location ~ddressed it~elf t~ this question. 52 It ~ound 
• ~ I .. 
:. 
that the, "t,ax, image ll of a state or, 10,cality ,is an importan,t variable in. 
industrial location decisions. Inmaki,ng up ~hj's t:ax, image, certain 
',-
features of state and local' tax struct~res we~e considered as.'favQrab!e'~, 
or 'unfavorable'. Of'primary impori:anc,e wa~ the 'concept ,of abroad,,: ' 
based tax structure which.divided the tax burden between' industry ahd 
other revenue sources. The' level of propertyta~es and income taxes 
determined whether a tax struct~r~ was favo~able'or unfavorable;· wh1le 
i~ventory taxes andperson~1 property taxes ~er~ ge~erally regarded ~~~ . 
unfavorable in all caSes. 
52A Report of the Committee on 
Pro ert Taxation and Interstate 
of National Tax Associat,ion 
" 
'1 
. -
" 
,"', . 
Fiscal Relations: 
Proceedings 
.' \ 
, ! 
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Property taxes were considered favorable if the state has: (I) 
relatively moderate assessments or tax rates; (2) certain property tax 
exemptions, particularly no personal property or inventory taxes; and 
(3) fair or uniform assessment administration. Conversely, a state 
would have an unfavorable property tax image due to: (1) "high" property 
taxes; (2) personal' property or inventory taxes; or (3) inequities in 
property assessments. 
This study confirmed the secondary importance of taxes among other 
location factors but still gave taxes a significant role. In regard to 
property taxes, it states that: 
In the industrial location decision process, property tax 
differentials have 1 ittle, if any, wide regional influence. 
In this selection process, most respondents viewed property 
taxes as being more important in the state of 'narrowing 
the choice to a few communities' or in 'selecting the final 
site'. This assumes a reasonable similarity in other more 
important economic costs: proximity to materials and markets 
as well as labor and land costs. 53 
Another extensive study of this subject found similar 'results. 
State-Local Taxation and Industrial Location has been termed "one of 
the most comprehensive summaries of taxation materials related to 
industrial plant location ever done.,·54 It also finds that taxes are 
of relatively low importance in the selection of a location for new 
industrial plants, when measured between regions. It states that: 
Between distant states, tax differentials appear to exercise 
1 ittle plant location influence. The plant locator will ordin-
arily select the region on the basis of economic rather than 
tax. factors. At this first stage in the selection process, 
accessibility to markets and materials, the character of 
53 Ibid ., p. 337. 
54Frankl in Jones,"Taxation and Industrial Location," New Mexico 
Business Vol 23 (June, 1970), p. 1. 
" 
", ' I 
transportation facil ities and the size of the labor cost 
differentials stand out as the more ~mportant locational 
factors. 55 
" 64 
However, the study goes on to say that: "With i n ':a state and more' 
particularly within a metropol (tan are~ significant local property tax " 
rate variations can and do be'come,swing factors in plant location 
decisions." 
So far, then, we can conclude that taxes can affect plant location 
decisions by vir,tueof the II image'" they create through their structure, 
and at the ,local 'level through differentials ,that may exist when most', 
, ' 
other costs are, fa.irly wefl equal ized. There are some additional' tax 
,',conside~ations which affect locatidn:decision~, ~hough. For instance,' 
there is evidence that growth and changes in taxes 'ar~'~ore significant 
,'56 . 
than tax levels. " One study summed 'the importance of' this' consi·derat'ion 
-by saying,that: "A, stable'tax structure is evide,nceof a stable state 
or community, and,~conomic, stability has an allure that no tax break 
can ever outshine. 1I57 
From these examples, it would seem th~t ~tates and municip~l ities 
should' be more concerned about devising broad-based and stable ta~ 
structures than withc.oncessions. It appears dqubtful that the forgiv-
., '-f, ~ " • 
ing of taxes would be 'sufficien~ to compensate'for hig~~r c'o'sts for, other 
, _. . . -;( ", -, .", 
factors. Where other factor costs are equal ized. a sound tax structure 
may be the best inducement: .' t 
55Cited by Cameron, ,01" cit. , p. I,; 
56Thomas F. Hady,' "Tax Structure and Reg i ona 1 Econom i c Growth: A 
Comment," Journal of Regional Science· Vol. 9. No.2" (August, 1969), 325-6. 
57jones, Ope cit., p. 4. 
The relationship between taxes and industrial location needs to 
be periodically re-examined, howev~r, as there is evidence that tax 
differentials may become more important in the future. As was observed 
by Floyd: 
Further investigation of industrial costs in various geo-
graphical regions reveals that certain types of costs are 
becoming more uniform among industrial sites. For example, 
competitive factors and the development of more efficient 
financial institutions are tending to equal ize capital ex-
penses among locations allover the nation. In addition, 
trade union activity and other factors are exerting similar 
influences on labor costs. Nevertheless, tax costs still 
continue to vary among locations because of differences in 
governmental pol icies and economic conditions among both 
state and local governments. The fact that tax cost data 
are usually available to manufacturers, whereas other cost 
information may not be available, tends to give additional 58 importance to tax differentials in locational problems. 
This might be even more true if taxes should rise as a percentage 
65 
of business costs. Using the corporate income tax data previously cited, 
it was found that taxes rose from 3.4 percent of deductible business 
oosts in 1963 to 3.6 percent, on the average, in 1969. 
It is unfortunate that more empirical evidence does not exist 
. 59 
regarding the influence of tax concessions versus tax costs. Poole 
and others have establ ished a corelation between location and tax costs, 
although it appears minor, but there' is very little evidence to show 
that plant locations have depended upon or been strongly influenced by 
tax concessions per se. Where they have been offered they have been 
used, of course, but this does not establ ish a causal relationship. 
Nonetheless, the abil ity of tax costs to affect marginal location 
58Joe Summers Floyd, Effects of Taxation on Industrial Location, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952), p. 23. 
59Poole, op. cit., p. 6. 
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decisions once the general area has ~een,selected infers that tax 
concessions may bo a useful tool for Illfluencing the location of Industry 
within local areas. 
',' 
., 
~ " 
No dramatic results ,should be expected, however • 
" 
, 
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CHAPTER V . ~ , 
BENEFIT/COST CONSIDERATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL 
:SUBSIDIES IN OREGON 
The previous chapters have examined the qbjectives qf a develop~ 
~.;: , 't 
ment sub~idy program, the types of subsidies tha~ migh~ be employed 
along with their respective eff~cts-'6n,~esource allocations, ,~n~ the 
influence of subsidies on industr1.1 10ca~ion d~cisi~ns., 'Thr~ughciut 
- ' , 
" '" r 
the analysi~, con~iderat~6ns which spe~itically re,lated to O~egon have 
, .! 
been mentioned. In t~is chapter, we will: review some additional fa'c'tors 
which influence the effectiveness of subsidy 'program's' on regiona"l ~con-
omic deve.1opmen~ particularly ,as they:' might apply't'o Oregon, as weH 'as' 
examining some of the fiscal imp1'icatio~~~ of, subs,idy pol'icies. 
Earlier in this',study it was menti.oned that the economic structure 
( . ~. ':,,' 
~~' ~ 1 
of the region will "have a major bearing"on the ~ff~ct'iven'e.ss ,of a; 
'/ , 
subsiqy program.,', A report prepared for the.-Pffic'e of Reg,lonal, Econom!'c 
Deve 1 opment in 1966 ana I yzed th i's :c~~d i t~~ on. 60 tn looking at th~'short~, 
, ,y '.,; (. • • • .~!; 
,.r~n economlc·and fiscal impact's of a new' autonomous :enterp:rlse in an' ./, 
'. ',, 
,area,. it establIshes a hypothetica,l plant' profi'le and,traces'th~ income 
flows throug~ tW? 1T!0dels, one for a Illarg~" ,area and one, for a. ~Ismal pi ", 
j 
area. Th~ large ar~awas one that co~ld suppJy ~os~ of ' the, special ize~ 
'~~. 
'p,roducts needed by the manufacturer,' along with more' general,ized needs-, 
such as"oifice supplies, maintena'1ce:mate:ri,als an~ business services. 
60 1 d . 1 L '. n ustrla ocatlon 
prepared for the Office of 
& Economics Reseatch) Inc. 
, , 
as a Factor ,In Regional Economic Development, 
Reg i ona 1 Econom i c Deve'lopment by Management ' 
(August, 1966)~ . 
• ~:'.' 'I 
.. ' ~ . i 
.~ 
,< 
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In the small area, however, many of these products and services had to 
be purchased from outside the area. 
Obviously, more of the income flows could be retained and recircu-
lated in the larger area. The models used produced an income multiplier 
of 1.8 in the large area, versus only 1.3 in the smaller area. 
The long-run impacts were equally variable. In assessing this 
aspect of the growth process, the study states: 
Whether or not a new plant will act as a catalyst in the 
growth process to bring about a change in the economy out of 
proportion to the short-run stimulus will depend on the way 
the new plant interacts with other activities in the area and 
on other circumstances. Thus, two areas experiencing similar 
short-run impacts could have very different long-run impacts. 
Only a detailed study of conditions in each area will yield 
reasogable hypotheses about the dynamic impact of plant loca-
t ion. I 
A study of industrial subsidization in West Virginia confirmed 
this statement. It estimated that the income multipl ier of new indus-
trial plants in that state would range between 1.8 and 2.8, "depending 
upon the industry considered" and its location within the state. 62 
Richardson also recognizes this condition. He states that: 
If a region suffers from unfavorable input-output access 
for most activities, an influx of new industrial plants will 
not solve its problems for the new industry will tend to 
assimilate the depression characteristics of the region as a 
whole. If out-migration is rejected for a region of tffi~ 
kind, its problems would have to be handled by much more 
extensive measures--such as rebuilding its infrastructure, 
stimulating its adaptabil ity to change, and investment in 
input-output access improvement. 63 
Obviously, then, simply moving in new industries cannot be consid-
61 Ib i d., p. 46. 
62The C~ntribution of Local Subsidies to the Economic Development 
of West Virginia, 1956-1966, West Virginia Center for Appalachian Studies 
and Development, West Virginia University (January, 1969). 
63Richardson, op. cit., p. 400. 
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orod as a universal :panacea for solving the, a.conom/c' problomsof all 
" '-
do~rossad raglons, To attempt to assess·;.~the beneflts'of·a regIonal 
I • 
r 
'subs i dy program in Oregon wou I d 'f i rs t' req'u ire ,deta i1 ed ana'1 ys i s of the ,~- ' 
, , .~ ,. ' 
regional economic structure fa attemp't to, measure the potentia('effi-
'ciencies of various locations, 
If such an analysis were' performed', it :would have impl ications ' 
for State po 1 icy. Som~ authors have' sugg.ested tha,t' efforts 'a i~ed 'at· -- .. " 
creating ~mploymen~ opportuniti~s for rura1 ~orkeri concentrate up~n 
locating those jobs i'n smaller urban 'centers wTihin.commuting distance 
of the target areas, . rather' than withi'n the target areas. ~hemselves, as 
, . ..::. : 
a means of.~reat~ng a larg~r number of em~loyment opportunities, In th~t 
way, the.~<?cial objectives 'of the subsJdyprogram might be"more easily 
attained without larg~ 'inv~stments in~ve~h~~d costs and'~)thout '~h~ . 
.... .. : 
- ... ~ - , "'~. 
" risk of cr;eat'ing a perm.anent subsidy situation due to«ineffi'ci;ncf~s o"f'-
, . 
the economic stru:cture ,in' th~ more remote' locations. 64.' 
Such ,a p'oficy would follow the "growth center" co'ncept, whereby -:':'-~'_ 
those areas~ithin the regio~ which have the greatest pot~ntial for ' 
,development are singled out for assistance', As' those area~ develop, .-'., 
" . 
externalities resulting ,from ,their economic growth 'enabl~ surr.ound)ng 
'. 
areas to receive beneficial spread effects.' , 
This kind 6f pol icy was:advocated in one of the Canadian studies, 
J', . ' - - ~ .. -
previously cited·, In recommending f,uture ac~Ion"the study states::..._ 
One of the major elements of a,'regiona'l development programme 
for Northwestern Ontar io wi 1'1' be a concerted effort to induce . 
. industry'tolocate in those' places .. where there is the greatest 
64 
'tRural Industrial ization and Other' Employment-Generating Activ-
;.' 
ities," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 52(5) (Dec., 1970) 
~pp. 734-735. ' 
- ~. 
, .... :-~:-
-::. 
potentiai for success and which have the capabil ity of influ-
encing the economic well-being of the region at large. Growth 
points are necessarily urban places, or places which are access-
ible to a population sufficiently large to sustain the economic 
growth process. In Northwestern Ontario the major criterion 
for growth point selection is accessibil ity--acc~ssibility.to 65 
resource~, to major markets and to other places In the region. 
70 
Concentrating on growth centers appears to produce the highest 
economic return for an area, primarily because of t~e higher multipl ier 
effects. The Canadian study cited, for example, showed very significant 
secondary and tertiary employment and income effects generated by 
induced primary investment in the growth centers. 
This does not mean, however, that investment in isolated areas will 
not provide local benefits. This can be demonstrated by another compre-
66 hensive study which involved five small communities in Kentucky. The 
major criteria used in selecting the study towns were that they were 
located outside SMSA's, that they had small populations (between 1,000 
and 5,000), and that at least one new manufacturing plant employing at 
least 100 people had been establ ished in the community during the study 
period of 1958-1963. Other selection criteria were used to ensure that 
no major economic development other than the new manufacturing activity 
had occurred during the study period and that adequate data on the 
effects of the new plants were available. Towns tied to the' economies 
of neighboring larger cities were el iminated from consideration. 
The five rural towns selected for the study ranged in population 
from 1,125 to 4,813, and the economies of the counties in which they 
were located were dominated by agriculture, with manufacturing accounting 
65rhe Northwest Ontario Regional Development Program, op. cit., p.58. 
66Charles B. Garrison, "New Industry in Rural Areas: The Local 
Economic Impact", Tennessee Survey of Business Vol. 6 (April, 1971). 
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for only six percent of the study counties' basic incomes in 1958~ The 
communities were also characterized by low incomes. Per capita incomes 
of the five counties in 1958 ranged from $596 (29 percent of the national 
average), to $995 (still less than 50 percent of the national figure). 
The composition of basic income was changed s~bstantially by the 
location of the new manufacturing plants during the 1958-1963 period. 
In 1963, the percent of the five counties' basic incomes attributable 
to manufacturing h~d risen to 12.1, and 52.9 percent of the manufactur-
ing income was generated by the new plants. In terms of employment, 
manufacturing increased its share of basic jobs from 7.8 percent in 1958 
(767 of 9,803) to 19.4 percent in 1963 (2,075 of 10,688). 
It can be observed that there was very 1 ittle growth in secondary 
and tertiary employment. There was also virtually no population growth. 
This was attributed to a high degree of underemployment prevalent in the 
five counties which resulted in workers shifting to the higher-paying 
manufacturing jobs. The major effect, then, was an increase in the 
marginal revenue product of labor, producing an income effect that was 
directly beneficial to the residents of the study area. 
Which pol icy, or combination, should be undertaken in Oregon will 
primarily depend upon determination of objectives. A pol icy'which is 
directed toward growth centers would appear to have greater probabil ity 
of attracting now industries to the region as growth centers can provide 
more easily the various economic factors which have already been identi-
fied as being more important in the location process than subsidies. 
Growth centers also offer greater opportunities for expansion of second-
ary and tertiary employment, thus accelerating the growth process and 
inducing popUlation shifts. If growth centers are not the focal point 
" , 
of State policy, however, be;nefits of industria'l, subs.id'ization can still 
", " be realized for the res'idents of rural areas., :: 
',' 
. As, a corolary to ~he problem ~f ~jff~renc~s in ,regional economic 
~) ~ 
~tructure,_ not all types' of ',in'dustrial fj'rms will produce simi lar-
stimul iito sustained growth. ,For this reason, Richardson s!Jggests the 
.' 
,importance of selective inducements rather than blanket; indiscriminate-
aid to all types of-_ f i rnis and a 11 i ndust,r i es. : -lie' says ,that i ndust r i es' 
. , 
_which give rise to'~ubstantial intra-~egional factor ~eceipt~ ~nd the 
pr~ducts of which'ex~ibit high income elasticities _of demand may deserve 
~" ~ . 
preferential treatment on the grounds that ,th~y iricrease eff~ctive 
d 1 • • d 67 emand as we 1 ,I -as emp oy underut I 1 I ze .resources. -' -: 
Studies of industrial .inducement prograrTIs in the United'States,'~ ,;,'. 
however, generallyind'icate -that the'y':~r~;- not us~d for 'ineffiCient - '-
,- , 
industries'. While selection'-:criteria -for sub-sidy 'recipi.ents vary 
between states, on overall balance the results ~ppear'tp be posi~ive:':". 
, One criticism levied a~~fnst!~ubsi~izat)o~--programs is that they 
attract only low-qual,ity, compan'ies wh'ich' wi 11 stay in the' 'a'rea-only as _ 
, , , - ' . - " -,' 68:, . ' .. 
. long as their subsidY,makes it profitable' to do ,so; Pi. corolarY,con-
" : 
tention is th~t the types of ,firms,most -sensitive to'financial ~nduce~ 
'.: 
,--' "'-' 
ment programs 'are' generally i-hose which are labor intensi~e rather; than. 
. , , 
~apital'intensive, which produce a lo~ dollar va'lue.per worker:a~d which" 
-.. - : 
, - -69 
general Iy,pay ,low wages .. If thos_e criticisms were val ia, it' is doubtful' 
i"' .,' 
,67Richardson', Ope cit., pp. 402-4031.-
. -, 
68Marsom B. Pratt, IIA ~an-ker views'kubsi-d'j'es and 
Industrial Development, '(M~rch, J963), pp,~' 5-7.'." ':.' .. 
6~~()rgan70p, cit,'-, p. 152 
.;: ... 
1 ... 0 .... _ 
'- ~ ... 
, " 
" ' 
Inducements;1I ", 
" 
.... -... 
. '~.,--
that attract ing suchindustdes wi II <l,ead ,to, substant ial' long-run, 
i 
" industria I improvement. 
'.,:' < ' "'" '. ~, 
Studies of the actual use of 'subsidies do not-'support thes~ c:;on-. 
.. '- ,:. 
" < 70" cl~sions, however. ~In the Alabama survey', cited,byThompson"it was 
;. 
, " 
found that ,38, firms, using industri.al 'bonds and pl~cing them high on the 
'list ,of locational determinants includ,edl5 of the, 19 lina tionally-known"' 
~ : 
" 
'firms which responded to the questionnaire. As' was' also pointed,out 
earl ier, those ,firms' invested more than twic,e the national average 
capital per w9rker. 
In fact,' t,he':very nature of industrial sub'sidies-makes ,them more 
condusive to use by capital-intensive firms than as labor 'subsidies. 
This' fact sho~l~ b~ rec6g~ized by ~tate, ~~enci~s because of its implic~­
tions. If'Oregon,adopts.acal'ita~ sub,sidy program,: it sh'ould anticipate 
that 'it!io,maj'o,r use wi'll, ~ome from firms ~'ith high capital requi,rements~" 
, • 7_' :. '-~ :.- -:: • ~ ; "~, ~ ,,_ ~ ~ 
Using the Alabama ,survey as a ,guide, Ore'gon,'mighte?<pect,t,o have to 
'" , -: . -.: - • '. ~ :. : f' ~ " 
subsidize,an average ,investment per' job created about twice the national 
, ~ -,' ~. w 
, " 
~ 
"average. A pol icy aimed a't keeping the costs of, subsidization 'propor-' " 
.., <" " '> > r 
-
tionately. low,would have the effect of'defeat}~9 the purpose of,capital < 
~, , ,-, . - ~, 
subs i d i~s~,': - , '..t ' 
1~' 
" H 
Trying to assess the potenti'al be~ef,its for Or~g~:m ·froni.t,~e adop'-
-
'tion of an industrial subsidizationp,rogr~m.then~ wi)1 depend upon '~he:, 
...... 
objectives o~ the policy'and ~h~'methodiemploye~. Once defi~ed ,deveJ'-' 
. , ' 
.: .. ~ 
opment objectives have been' ',e.;;tabl ished, ,an eco~o~ic base ana'lysis,will' 
. . 
provi'de informat ion as to'the I'!umber of prJmary jobs and leve'1 of in-
. ~ : ,~ , 
duced income that need tO,'be generated to accompl ish those o~jectives.:' 
~ . ~~ ," 
• ~ j , ~ '. 
70 ' Thomp son, ?p. 'c i t. ',: 
" . -.. ' ~ - '" 
" " 
, .. A 
" , 
, , 
';' 
, 
Different areas can then be compared for their po.tent,lals and develop~, 
>, • ~ 
men't s~rategy can concentra.te upon locat\ons where ther~ is the, great~st 
pr.omise ~f accompl ishing the ,objec"tives:'" It must be. 'recognized,. ho~ever, 
., '. - '"'.'. 
that different'resultswill beproduced~i~ diff~re~t areas and 'from 
different methods. :"', 
; - ~ 
Fiscal Costs 
The financial costs to government -resulting from, subsidy programs 
will also vary according,tO',the'-methods ,use~. ,'Loan guarantees, for, 
exampl~, 'involve practlcal~y nO dire~t. costs, other than administra~ive, 
unless the {irm bei~g subsidized should defa.ult. At fhe same time, loan 
guarantees are not one of 'the mor~ successful 'forms o{' i'nducements so 
thei'r ret,u~n., even for the small-costs'involved, may oemargina1.' It 
must'be c~nsidered also that government~l agencies generally,have large 
• , 4 -" ~ ~ _ ~.. : 
borroWing r~quirements to finance their own projects and rely upon their 
tredit positions to en~~re 16~ interest, rates. - Lack bf discriminat)on 
in underwriting i~dustrial"loan~ could jeo~~rdize this ~osition. 
,The granting o{ direct loans has simila~ 'Impl ications-attached to 
,,'it. In ~his case, however, a dlr'ed tr~nsfe~ ,of p~bl ic"fu.nds is'involved'-
. , 
These funds can be obtai.ned'either:-,',from,:revenue ,sources', 'such'as taxes, 
- ~~ 1 '-
, ,: . ~ 
or from borrowing.' Borrowin'g offers"the advantage of 'attract,ing mobile 
, 
.capital from outs·ide' the are,a and deepening th~' capi'taL base. ' Again,' 
: . .Y.:' ., l ~.,. 
ho.wever"it may limit,the borrowinglJoWer of t;he'state to finance other 
....; ;. 
,projects or increase the'costs ofth~se p:rojects by" iricreasing~interest 
~ -~ . 
costs. 
',' 
Direc,t ,loans,are of,t~~ made by agoyernmental agen~y'from general' 
" 
tax revenues or the' sale of ta~ exempt bonds. "An ,~nalys,is of both types 
, • ~ < 
, .~. 
'<;, 
, -
.' 
_ 1 
..; 
" ' 
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of loans ~as made -~y Saz~ma,' who u~ed the bond-~1nanced program of -New': . ' 
, " 
York and the tax-financed ~rogram of,PennsyJv~nia as ~odels, and com-
, - ' 71 
pared them with programs in oth'er state~ ,which reI ied on borrowing. 
" 
He concluded that· on the whole', stat,e loans have a positive,net b'enefit 
'by tnducin:g a 'net ,'ncrease' in state :income. ,Accordingly,he stated, 
, ' 
that more tax revenue -would be induced than fore-gone. :', 
However, in looking at the alte~native.types of loans, ~e' decided 
• , -'"> • .-
that a program financed hy borrowing would be de,finitely superior to a 
direct loan program finC!,nced ~y taxation~'When a program is financed 
, .' 
by borrowing, the repaym~nt of , 'loan principal can be use'd,to amortize 
th~ state debts "'originally incu'rred. Interest and fees ,would u~ually 
be sufficient to cover operating costs and losses. A tax-financed 
program, on the other hand; would. not ,be' self-fi~anc.ing until ther~ wer,e 
'sufficient loan repayments to c~ver new' loan disbursements. If the 
. " 
, , ' 
years equa'l,~o' the average term of loans outstanding:. " '; 
Other studies of 1;ax'-financed loans or tax- exemp't revenue bonds' 
, " 
seem ,to support the contention that t'he overall resul,ts are p<?sitive~.·~t., 
~'; 
least' on' the state and local level. In assessing the. Alabama program, 
for 'example, Thompson_ estimated'that, industrial 'revenue' bonds had 
~ ! ~ 7 ' 
.-~ . 
attracted r,oughly 60 firms and 17;000 job.s to ,the st~te,"du~ing the '1958-. 
1968 period. Without th,ese, jobs, he estimated tbat Alabama,resi,dents' 
would annually lose an estimated $IOO--mil,lion' in wage and_,salary income,' 
:"" - - ~- ...... ,. 
j~n<?ring completely anV multJP1ier:effects.,· ~e~ capita i~comes would be, 
'f 
one to two percent lower •. He further est;imates that state and local tax 
7~sazama, op;'cit. 
-~ .... _: .... __ -t..~~~ 
... ~.'; 
",--.(. 
, ' 
76 
revenues are between $4-5 million greater because of the Increased 
invustmont and Incomo. He places the cost to the u.s. Treasury at 
$18 million on $785,697,000 of tax-exempt bonds, but indicates signifi-
cant recovery of much of this loss from the added taxable incomes. 72 
Much more detailed analysis is possible regarding the fiscal 
effects of tax supported loans but, on balance, it would appear that 
they produce net benefits. 
It is hard to find supportive evidence for tax concessions, how-
ever. Most such concessions have been related to the property tax where, 
the direct impact is felt most strongly by the local governments that 
have to provide the services needed by new industry. Hale -has observed 
that: 
Numerous studies suggest that where tax exemptions are 
granted to local industry, the publ ic service requirements 
of the industry may force increases in taxes if the qual ity 
of public services is to be maintained. However, in many 
depressed areas what is often required is an improvement 
in publ ic services. This, of course, means that local taxes 
must increase for the non-subsidized portion of the community 
and that the subsidy cost is much greater than the amount of 
revenue foregone by not taxing the subsidized plant.73 
This consideration has direct relevance for Oregon when it is 
remembered that those counties which appear most in need of development 
already have some of the lowest property tax rates in the state. 
This view also becomes significant when it is remembered that tax 
concessions will be used, when they are available, regardless of whether 
they are crucial to the investment decision. A louisiana study of 609 
72T~ompson, op. cit. 
73Carl W. Hale, liThe Optimal ity of local Subsidies in Regional 
Development Programs: Reply,lI Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 
Vol. 10 (August, 1970), 88-9. 
77 
property tax' exemptions involving about $355 million in new plant and 
. . 74 A f d th 1 I t equ i pment makes th' s po, nt. survey oun at on y one p an , rep-
resenting a $25 mill ion investment, would have been lost if the tax 
exemptions had not been available. To gain this one plant, in effect, 
the state and local governments lost $51.4 mill ion over a 10-year 
period. 
Here again, however, the structure of the program and the exter-
nalities involved should be considered. If a state program is designed 
to shift population and resources away from high tax cost areas to 
regions where incremental tax costs are lower, there may be an offsetting 
benefit. An example is given in a study of Washington State1s highway 
costs which found underutil ization of highways in the sparsely populated 
areas and congestion in the areas of population concentration. The 
report estimated that if 15 percent of the new population growth could 
be shifted to the sparsely settled areas, there would be an annual 
savings by 1985 of $50 mill ion by reducing the need for highway expend-
75 .. 
itures. 
While this kind of approach might partially justify the initial 
foregoing of taxes to accompl ish long-term tax savings, it does not 
negate the earl ier conclusions that there are less-cost ways' to reach 
the same end. 
Another consideration to the question of fiscal impact relates to 
the type of firms being subsidized. Kee makes the observation that 
74Wi 11 iam L. Henderson, "Are Industrial Tax Concess ions Necessary?", 
Arizona Review of Business and Public Administration, XIV (Feb., 1965),8. 
75Final Re art on How Industrial Decentral ization Could Affect 
Washington State Highway Costs Richland, Wash.: Battelle Memorial 
Institute, October, 1968). 
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some firms provide more local revenues while ~emanding fe~er local 
, 6' , " ' • 
services ihan others. 7 An e~a~ple,w~uld'be ~h~ iirm that hite~ pri-
marily secondary wage:earners) thus creating littl~ additional,d~mand 
, , ~. 
for hous i ng and ut i-1 i ty requ i rements. 
',The view o~ fiscal effects'of subsidized industry, then, is 
',,:?mplex. When looked at from a ~o_st~be~efit position,:,.there are many 
• -i 
variables associated with the type 'of- ~ubsidy" the I,evel of government 
considered, tho economic structure of the, region and the type of ,firm .. 
'By looking at all ,these variables, however, it should. be possible -to, " 
find an ~p~imum program-which does 'produc~ a net benefit, at leas~ for' 
o ~,~ , 
local government, 'for inducing, ~ew industria'1 investme'nt: to depressed,' 
: '. i 
areas. 
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'CHAPTER~ V I : 
- . ,: 
CONCLUSION 
;: 
~ ...... , 
. ~ " 
This study has reviewed several aspects of the efficacy of induced 
i ndustr ia i .i nvestment as, a means ,'of' st imu I at ing' economi c dev~ I~p'men: in' 
depressed areas: 
- - ~, " 
Its purpos~ was t?,hop~fully ~rovide lnformatlon use-
ful to the, State of Oregon .as it'considers adop~ingan incentives pro-
" 
',' 
gram. 
In considering the justiflcations.fo~ such a pro~ram, it was found 
, " 
that considerable imbalance 'existsin'ihe degree, of economic health pre-
'. '.~ - .' 
vailing thro,ughout the stat~. Population ,changes alone~ which showed' 
one-third of Oregon1s cou~ties l~s}ng population between 1960 and 1970, 
" . 
might be sufficient to warrant interest.~in redirect'lng,growth patterns .. 
~ "', ~ • ~ f ' • ,-" " ~ • F _.;: • I. :" .,. 
But of greater sign i f i ca'lce' are the ~d i spai"i ties"" in incomes, unemp I oyment, -
, -. A ~. - • < ' • .~ ~ ". 
population of labor-force' age:' et~. ,,'which giv; 'eviden~~, that certain 
, :. < , 
parts of the state are p!".ogr'essively becoming poorer· in relation to 
other areas, part'icularly the Wi I,lamette Valley." If it can 'be assu~ed 
, , 
that' the ,State, has, a I.egitimate function in trying t9 help its citizens 
;" .. ' 
achieve equi,ty in economic opp'ortunities,' then there"m~y, be a role for 
State action .in t~ying 10 disperse i industria~ lrivestm~nt .to areas'of-'~' 
'- ~ -. 
econom i c distress. In terms of effects ~n 'gross state,but'put and',. 
efficiency in resource allocation, ho,wever, it:,was.shown that, there'are 
costs involved in' "shifting resources- to areas of lower 'producti~ity and 
';- '.' . ~ .. . . ~. . 
that the principal benefits of an' industrial dis~ersirinprogram may'b~ 
social rather than 'economic. " t ' ...... 
" ' ~ 
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From the research done on this study, it became apparent that 
# 
various forms of subsidies can affect industr)al location in different 
" 
, , 
ways, but that the effects are only marginal and incentives Will only 
be useful where ot'her' conditions for economic efficiency exist,. As 
th'j s fi nd i ng was vi rtua 11 y unan imous' ina 11 the cases rev i ewed, it can',' 
be assumed ,that it ~ou)d al~ betr~e in Oregon.' Incentives, then, will 
• /' \ ~ /., ;.? 
not replace other economic 'fadors in cs>mpany, ,location deCisions. As a' 
, , 
prerequisite to efforts to shift indus,tries' to distressed areas, analysis 
, '. 'f.~ 
should be made of the econOmic resources available in' those areas with 
, ' 
a view toward determining their poteritial fo~ efficiency in production. 
. - . ~ ~~ --" 
.. '. f 
It may 'be found that other, types of publ ic investment may be ,necessary, 
such as, in highways,' t ra in i ng 'j:> rograms and ut I ITt i as,' before subs I,d i es 
could become effective. 
It was also found that financial' incentives are generally more 
effect ive than, tax 'concess ions. T~ i s ~oul d probab ly' ,beespecia l,ly 'true' 
in Oregon, "where i~ ~as found'that those count ies ~os·t:'.'j nn~ed 'of econ-
omic improvement presently '~how among the lowest ,tax' rates in, the state 
and could ,least afford'to forego tax revenues. r 
, Next" the poss'ibl,e benefit~ofan 'industrial subsidy were-reviewed 
, according'totwo add'itional variables: the economic structure'of the 
region, and ',the' types of firms subs:idized. In this regard, the possibil-
, i ty Ot '~oncentrat tng effor~s:"an estab 1 i.shed gro~th centers ,where the' 
precon,dit'ions for economic efficiency alreaay exist',< was 'considered as 
a means of maximizing economic' returns to subsidies. It was also shown 
that the potential users 'of a, subsidy progr.am tend to be firms in 
capital-intensive industries~ leading ~o the conclusion 'that large 
capital subsidies migh:t be required to p·roduce .. any·~srgnif-icant benefits 
'. '. 
. " 
, 81 
on Jabor force absorption. 
Finally, the fiscal costs of an inducement ptogram were exam-
ined. It,was found that there are 'important variab.1es which determine 
the fisca~ impact-of incentive programs ~n state and,local governments 
but ~hat ~y proper ~onsiderati~n of those variabl~s a program cari be 
formulated which produces posttive fiscal benefits. 
.... ~.~ .,. 
In conclusion, :it can be"stated,that incentive programs can only 
influence the location of industry,- not determ!ne it. M~st firms will 
still prefer to locate where there are inherent economic advantages, 
and this usually m~ans,the metropol"itan areas;' Where the alternatives· 
,exist, however, an incentivepr'ogrammaytip the balance, in favor 'of a 
,sma I ler, community -in a depressed'area. Cons'idering the,geographical- --', 
. ~ , -
...;. : 
imbalances in the Oregon economy, using in-centives as a means. 'to 
. -! ' 
disperse econom ic ,and popu I at,ion growth wou I d appear to offer -potent i al 
benef its. -
' .. - .. 
~. .: 
.... -. <'~.~ 
, , 
,~:. l ~, .. ~ .-
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lemhnc 'l'Ist1tvhol' 10 , aUI/!f'td bUSH'U\ 
13-\.0"1'$ :rply to le!;dtnllli eOl'll!ruCII!JII ~rJy 
14 -Ul'ld~f tit Hellt 'fOt~ Job i!'l(tt\tl'tt fjfOcr.lm, I (:ot()OrJte" 
filref'l!f Of unlAcolvortte<H:lIJsmtss fu crtdft 'S l!tO\llte<J 
~~ ~~: ::~';Jo~;;::ra\;: t~ 1~~~~b~~~1 ~thl~~1~5e~~ '~~~~ 
be II)Clttd' In I lOfHl\Come Uthol'! of ~ (ity of 50,000 01 
more lX'O":<1Mn or to Ilow"lntome: fiftjl COIlJ'lly Thr film 
InUS' Ctr"'f or ,tr,m It tcul tlVf to~s ,nd pro\'Ntt &I'! ,p. 
pJovtd t(Ifl'lIJ'Ii tUOiwn II'! JddrhOl1, the lltle,' sn.11! or 
thf fwt4,i ~oIume: of bl.ltll!:fSl mUll be 'tom oulslde of 
;~I:;t."~ wc~~b" I~l ::1e:!t ':"t~olr\:Ou:!~~~~"'I,:r 1 \~~ 
u ..... _ .. loQlnoll 54 "'Y be 10100 In.,eod 01 lhe 
SPECIAL SERVICES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
... - .Nt" 11l'l.'Olft'", 1\ .:!()_eo4 I pnlffc/HI,I illt Qt l'i .,lft., 
I'I'I;JI",,,,11\ 'I:, Of ~O Ott m,oc 
4,-\!,II(I~((Qi It ,J1o-td tP fttMOf,j')il <J' 60~ 0' til filII', 
bI~t' Ol (011QI\ ;)\ ,!VJ Ptt"vlt 10'\ 
46 - h. tfcd,,, IItO.~ to ;f'tlr·utj(flll,r\ ,1'14 tilOcrl10tS for 
tlfOOl!'fl,l'le1 1),>i1 -on ,.),)d\ In plean 
., ... r It {ttdlf .11u_tl1 IOf !I~t OJ O!Oi1vn1 of ~I.f. soA 
.~ ~ (tf~i)hOIl IHOft4 IItl<l(1 "(1101, ,,, ."HUt (ol'l'Utu(ilOIJ 0111, 
4lj-£lfmpl "om u.u,\lsr till' lJul flcl!rom bltJllIfJ\ uOtld 
1>. 
50 -1.001«1 c~l, 10 ~'t lnd _"'-/ p.)11\tf"101\ contlOi f<jvl,ul".foftl 
Si - {,G\ ~tPd,: ,1~C.td 
S1 . SUIt' • ." 1,. "'rTuM'lel~ /0(,14, 
il .. "~jU ',,",'C""f'\f ~OdU 't(olftmfl\d~ b, SlUl Jot Jd(1)tlQ" 
tI:, .. ,;,.'C·UI,''("S, 
,,-. 'I' crt(l,f .110141 to 1,\ 01 q""hl·td Uf'UI .n'fuff(! lit ,..... 
"Oth(~.OJ'l '.1(,·,1..-, tn.y bf IOOJ-t'I:J .,"-11\1 .. bu\tl"U 
(o'''''llt ",lfIe'ln" I.IIM(G'OQI4Itd b~h"t\1 IlIcOil'f .of 
Pt'Sf\.1 <A(Ot"C It_ h.I~l, r~ 1.11 (rf~J,I 11 ',W-((-", Ie 
1It,wI'lii.t lit ...,., ,....,..nr ,~ IKllm .1\1(:" hi .. 
~f ... ,' ~ _ .'" 
, v\flu! lIlf of U ;("l\t to\l' ,t",\ "J'!.j jtt vttO Itl If'lJil1u 
I'LIIiWIC ,nOUillllt Httl'lt·,tlt lI!f'l\ltI( t!'tllhtlt .ull 
cllt1ulJl 0' (O"',,"~H:';t flS~'l'i fift'lf f('iU".' 11'1(1 dh,IO!) 
f'N'I'I' IUllthU Itt., ~t{t ,,"\ OOI'l.1"I ,1'1 Ol,tff 01 rf\t ."1, olt 
dt\.(tlb~ ,1'1 !.dOl MIt' ~~ A O.lfl( .. I .. ' Ifll1:'itl'!'lttll j\ Mt 
,It{'O·t liH botl'! If'lt II\;.t~t""'j\i t.tN'> Jit>~ nll\tt \tlft I .. 
.,.(tl\! (f!\ COq.'Ilf~U.· "'''{''I~~ 1,IC'rt'\ .111 ;tlI'Hh,t to' 
« UQv11ro \0 f).fr f fI'I'~'I\'I\lm 1,* 1)1 'JJ~ 'Mt/jllf ""J 
('tC,1 ftlYl4tft.nl tnt, be Uttt-1 tn,.,f'" fQ S\ltl1tQv'lIt 
,.'" 
~)-Coii:\ p,t<.d 01 1Jt(1I11f'd ~ 1 ... bIt ~"" _; Ift(QfOO,,,t-td Of 
\If'l1fl(~tP¢tll~ ti<.:1Iot'Ht'\ tot !'If'll A&!) t,(.hllt' 101 fJ!. 
dUlt"*, _mt IfUtll'f'" 1,r;lhI-e1 .NJ <If 10' t., I)(INIll108 
((1M,,» "(It.r,., ... , ~ dt'4'j(IN ." [\/llt"'l fJprlt'"U fro," 
nn II'ItO""t 'Of tu :l'J'P01.U the 1" ('toM dt1t:h ... 
f¢¢t"'Olt St mt, tit Ilktft I" ltt\l (I' rh., (ltd'll 
s& .. St.tts ttl' 'fttlflltIfU' or" 'Mt~t"'n "'U'f)I'OR $/-A .... -. ... <_ ............. '..,_I4 .. _ ,... . 
~! lll,\f"'1lo It'.h"'l.ll JHI\IIl\(t 
5" f;(ih'ln h.l""t!Jr -on I (onlt,w"., bUll 
~ ~1~~O,:\t~~,~ O~f~~O~~':~o~~:v,~rflf::~~~~fe~a:~ 
00\(,:1 o.'l}Yfd'~. 11«: If.'!d k)t tI'I\S1oI,'rt 
U H'C ..... , Co"'trhlb:ltt WI" bu4d ~r11 '" Ahttl ef IO.td ,,,,«> 
~'''IfU\ 
Gl A,~ .... rtd !o «",.tt ufllli 
6-f- St':f--S~~'U l~'\, 01 ual 01 IdIl'hl\l'SffN'l' I»'OI'.Jt!l:S. ftO 
(t"o .. t\...r/'>'I'Itflof 10 II/,nett 
65 PtO ... "" ,loN, I~ I'(t ilHIJI\U' 
l,6-tt~::f.IIt'l"HI.lf1 NkIM( flftld. fat $'IIil-MtlrOOQldIA 
,lftl 
~1 ~ft1tl ~\lf UtfO~If\ kx'tI IffVtlofmtftl (OfPOl1h~HU 
g ~ AO;lfo.l!lft te ,ftdu1frl,)i kUU lO'd. 
69 - PM' jJ'i:tl(f1 ~1 
10 - Crllra~ (O\<iflt1 .,f .uJItOflttlS to flUt "'" lft' 10, D\lf 
IOVf.f Itlitvlft\iJ dM\OJMtftl SPf(If"II\'t bvUd1/11' ~ 
_ .... __ I1' .... tct ......... " .... 
